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EDITOR '8 BRIEF 
In this issue of The Colonial Lawyer: A Journal o/Virginia Law and Public Policy, six 
authors present insightful commentary on a number of diverse and changing areas of 
Virginia law. 
On the subject of the sanctioning of lawyers, Keith Finch's article explores the 
purposes and effects of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the equivalent provision, 
_ 8.01-271.1, of the Virginia Code. Additionally, Mr. Finch reports and analyzes the 
results of a survey conducted by The Colonial Lawyer of general district court and circuit 
court judges in Virginia regarding their respective views on the implementation of _ 8.01-
271.1. 
On the medical-legal front, Deborah Ryan addresses whether the Natural Death Act of 
Virginia, _ 54-325.8:1-13 of the Virginia Code, is useful to individuals existing in a 
persistent vegetative state. She explores the right of both the patient in this condition and 
the surrogate decisionmaker acting on behalf of the patient to discontinue treatment. Ms. 
Ryan concludes that the Natural Death Act should be amended to categorize persons in 
a persistent vegetative state as legally dead or to guarantee the patient in a persistent 
vegetative state the right to deny treatment by expanding the living will doctrine. 
Anne Bowling examines recent developments in the law on the subject of AIDS (Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) and discrimination in the workplace. She surveys 
statutory and case law both on the federal and state level, and concludes that in order to 
prevent workplace discrimination, employers must take steps to educate themselves and 
their employees about the disease. 
Michael Grattan discusses the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Lyngv. North-
west Indian Cemetery Protective Association on government regulation of religious in-
stitutions under the free exercise clause of the first amendment. He examines the zoning 
power of governments and the impact of Lyng on different states' treatment of religious 
use property in the zoning context. Mr. Grattan then discusses how Virginia, which has 
never squarely addressed the role of federal or state free exercise clauses in the zoning 
context, should merge its existing zoning law with the free exercise jurisprudence after 
Lyng. He concludes that as long as Virginia lawmakers act reasonably and consider reli-
gious beliefs when making zoning decisions, they should be able to zone religious facil-
ities almost without constraint. 
In our final article, The Practitioner's Guide, Peter Jordan and Steve Nachman, the Re-
search Editors for the publication, provide a general overview on the subject of lawyer 
advertising and solicitation in Virginia. Following the article is an interview with Phillip 
B. Morris, President of the Virginia State Bar Association, regarding efforts of the Bar 
Association to further regulate solicitation by lawyers in Virginia. 
As the year comes to an end, I would like to introduce the new Editrix-in-Chief of the 
publication for 1990-1991 academic year, Lisa J. Entress. I wish you all the best in the 
coming year. I wish also to express my gratitude to my editors and staff for a job well 
done. Your commitment has made this year a success. 
The Editors and the Staff of The Colonial Lawyer: A Journal of Virginia Law and 
Public Policy hope that you, the practitioner and the scholar, find the articles of Volume 
19, Number 1, insightful and stimulating. Your suggestions, comments, and criticisms 
are welcomed. 
Thomas Paul Sotelo 
Editor-in-Chief 
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VIRGINIA'S NEW RULE 11 "CLONE" -- AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Keith Finch 
INTRODUCfION 
Introduced in 1983 to "discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to 
streamline the litigation process,"1 the amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure have generated a stonn of controversy throughout their relatively, brief 
childhood. The seven years since the amendments' promUlgation have seen an 
explosion in the number of cases involving Rule 11,2 prompting considerable study by 
representatives of the bar, the bench and the scholarly community.3 Although it appears 
that district judges predominantly favor the new Rule,4 the legal community's support 
for the amendments is hardly unanimous. Commentators have expressed concern that 
Rule 11 may now be aggravating the very problems it was supposed to solve,s and the 
absence of truly unifonn standards has led many practicing attorneys to join the ranks 
I Amendments to Rules, Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983) 
(hereinafter Advisory Committee Note). 
2 Almost 700 district court and circuit court decisions analyzing Rule 11 were 
published in the period between the Rule's August 1, 1983 effective date and 
December 15, 1987. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 234 
(1988). By comparison, researchers have uncovered only 40 Rule 11 cases decided 
in the eight years prior to the amendments. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended 
Federal Rule 11 -- Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation 
and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1315 n.18 (1986) (citing 5 C. WRIGHT & A. 
MnLER, FEDERAL PRACllCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1332-34 (1983 Supp.». 
3 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th 
Cir. 1986). 
4 Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 lIARv. L. REv. 1013, 1014 (1988). 
S See, e.g., Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. 
REv. 1, 34 (1984) ("The more insidious danger lies in the possibility of a casual and 
unconsidered debilitation of the adversary system through the overzealous pursuit of 
the very end we seek to achieve -- the swift, efficient, and fair resolution of 
lawsuits. "). 
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of the Rule's most bitter critics.6 As one commentator put it, "little has been gained,'" 
and the future of Rule 11 remains very much in question. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia strode boldly into this whirlwind three years 
ago, when the General Assembly overwhelmingly approvedB an amendment to the 
Virginia Code which virtually duplicates the language of Rule 11. This new statute 
is § 8.01-271.1, which became effective on July 1, 1987.9 Virginia's judges have now 
had almost two and a half years to apply and interpret the new rule, and their views 
could very well be a matter of great concern for every attorney practicing civil law in 
Virginia. Yet no coherent body of jurisprudence has developed surrounding § 8.01-
271.1, for neither the Virginia Supreme Court nor the Virginia Court of Appeals has 
yet made any significant rulings on the new statute. Indeed, only three reported 
opinions have even mentioned § 8.01-271.1, and none of these provides the slightest 
hint of how the new rule is being applied. 10 
In an effort to bridge this information gap, The Colonial Lawyer: A Journal of 
Virginia Law and Public Policy asked all Virginia's circuit court and general district 
court judges to participate in an anonymous mail survey designed to gauge their 
6 Joseph, The Trouble With Rule 11: Uncertain Standards and Mandatory 
Sanctions, A.B.A. J., August 1987, at 87, 89 ("Practicing under Rule 11 is like 
negotiating a minefield. You know there will be an explosion if you step on a 
mine. The trouble is, you don't know where the mines are."). 
, Shaffer, Introduction to SEcrION OF LrnGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
SANCfIONS: RULE 11 AND OrnER POWERS at 15 (1988). 
B JOURNALS OF TIlE SENATIl OF VIRGINIA, 1987 REGULAR SESSION, at 752 (two 
dissenting votes); JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
1987 REGULAR SESSION, at 1092-93 (two dissenting votes). 
9 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1989). Refer to note 73 infra. 
10 The three opinions are: Vance v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 714 F. Supp. 203, 206 
(E.D. Va. 1989) (section 8.01-271.1 could not be applied because federal law 
preempted state law); Lannon v. Lee Conner Realty Corp., 238 Va. 590, 594, 385 
S.E.2d 380, 382-83 (1989) (fees could not be awarded because § 8.01-271.1 was not 
in effect at the time of entry of the final decree); Vaughn v. McGrew, 12 Va. Cir. 
125, 126 (1988) (motion for costs denied because demurrer and motion for summary 
judgment had been denied). 
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attitudes toward § 8.01-271.1. Before reporting the results of the survey, however, this 
article will briefly describe (1) the major currents in Federal Rule 11 jurisprudence, (2) 
other states' solutions to the problem of frivolous lawsuits, and (3) Virginia law prior 
to the passage of § 8;01-271.1. 
FEDERAL RULE 11 
The Amendments 
Rule 11 was amended in 1983 for the express purpose of improving its 
effectiveness as a deterrent to abusive litigation tactics.1I The old Rule 11,12 which 
had not been changed since 1938, was considered to have generated too much confusion 
about the circumstances triggering its operation, the standard of conduct it expected of 
II Advisory Committee Note, supra note 1, at 198. The pertinent text of the 
amended Rule 11 is as follows: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an 
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual 
name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an 
attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his 
address. . .. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate 
by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the 
best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or need,less increase in the cost of 
litigation. . .. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation 
of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose 
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the 
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
12 The original version of Rule 11 required parties to sign their pleadings and 
treated each attorney's signature as a certificate that "he ha[d] read the pleading; that 
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there [was] good ground to 
support it; and that it [was] not interposed for delay." Pleadings which violated the 
rule could be "stricken as sham and false," and attorneys could be subject to 
"appropriate disciplinary action" for "willful violation" of the rule. 28 U.S.C. app. 
540-41 (1982). 
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attorneys, and the range of sanctions it authorized judges to impose.13 The amended 
Rule sought to solve these problems by reducing "the reluctance of courts to impose 
sanctions" and by "emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those 
obligations by the imposition of sanctions."14 To accomplish these objectives, the 
amendments established several new standards: 
1. An attorney must make a reasonable inquiry into both fact and law 
before filing any paper with the court. 
2. The paper must be well-grounded in fact. 
3. The paper must be supported by law, or by a good faith argument for 
a change in the law. 
4. The paper must not be interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause delay. 
5. Sanctions are mandatory once a violation is proven. 
6. Payment of the opposing party's attorney's fees is explicitly established 
as a legitimate sanction. 
7. Clients, as well as their attorneys, are subject to sanctions. 
8. The court may impose sanctions either upon motion or upon its own 
initiative. IS 
The Standard of Objective Reasonableness 
It is now settled that subjective good faith, which was enough to protect an 
attorney from sanctions under the old Rule 11, is no longer a safe harbor. 16 Though 
the old Rule limited its scope to punishment of "willful violations," under the amended 
13 Advisory Committee Note, supra note 1, at 198. 
14 Id. 
IS FED. R. CIv. P. 11. Refer to note 11 supra. 
16 Shaffer, supra note 7, at 2. 
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Rule 11 "[i]nexperience, incompetence, willfulness or deliberate choice may all 
contribute to a violation."17 The amended Rule requires attorneys to make a prefiling 
inquiry into both fact and law, and their investigative efforts are to be judged according 
to an objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. IS This means that 
an attorney does not violate the rule if a "reasonable attorney" in an identical situation 
would believe his actions to be legally and factually justified.19 The practical effect of 
this objective standard is "to eliminate the defense of personal ignorance of defects in 
a paper challenged as unmeritorious."20 In other words, "[a]n empty head but a pure 
heart is no defense. "21 Of course, a party which files papers for an improper purpose 
is still· subject to sanctions, and federal courts have not hesitated to apply Rule 11 to 
parties who have acted in bad faith.22 
Reasonable Factual Inquiry 
Whether an inquiry is "reasonable" or not depends upon the circumstances of 
each case,23 and courts have considered many factors in determining whether an attorney 
17 Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987). 
18 Advisory Committee Note, supra note 1, at 198. 
19 Cabell, 810 F.2d at 466. See also Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 
F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The 'reasonable man' against which conduct is 
tested is a competent attorney admitted to practice before the district court. "). 
20 Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830. 
21 Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 851 
(1986). 
22 See, e.g., Chu by Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1985) (suit filed 
against judge in attempt to force him to recuse himself from a divorce proceeding 
was brought for an "improper purpose"); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 827 
F.2d 450 (9th Cir.), aff d in part, vacated in part and remanded, 836 F.2d 1156 (9th 
Cir. 1987) ($4.2 million counterclaim was frivolous, filed to harass the plaintiff and 
to deter similar actions from being brought). 
23 Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 812 F.2d 984, 988 (5th Cir.), reh' g granted, 
822 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1987), aff d in part, vacated in part and remanded, 836 F.2d 
866 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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has made an adequate factual and legal investigation before filing a pleading. Whether 
a factual inquiry is sufficient may depend upon factors such as the amount of time 
available for investigation, the degree to which the attorney must rely upon his client 
for factual information, whether the attorney accepted the case from another member of 
the bar, and the need for discovery to develop the factual circumstances underlying the 
claim.24 Courts have thus sanctioned attorneys for, among other things, failing to 
contact a client at least once before filing a pleading,2!i neglecting to check readily 
available medical records,26 and failing to inspect state records to see if a defendant was 
a subsidiary or a corporation.27 Extended inquiry alone will not save a meritless claim 
from the penalty of sanctions,28 and attorneys are naturally required to act upon the 
information their investigations uncover.29 Courts and commentators disagree, however, 
over whether attorneys are under a continuing obligation to evaluate the reasonableness 
of their claims30 or whether Rule 11 limits the scope of sanctionable behavior to the 
pre-filing period.31 
24 Id. 
2!i Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton, 809 F.2d 548, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1986) (as 
amended by subsequent order 1987). 
26 Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road Machinery, 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1250 (D. 
Minn. 1984). 
27 Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc. v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 112 F.R.D. 
664, 668 (S.D. N.Y. 1986). 
28 Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). 
29 Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(once three key witnesses had been deposed and had repudiated the accusations 
forming the basis for the complaint, plaintiff's counsel acted unreasonably in filing a 
brief in opposition to a motion for summary jUdgment). 
30 See Nelken, supra note 2, at 1331 ("Imposing such a continuing duty 
properly requires the parties to use information gained in discovery to refine and 
narrow the issues and claims on which they intend to go forward. In addition, it 
discourages the use of litigation to coerce settlement for purely economic reasons."). 
31 See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 
1988) ("Like a snapshot, Rule 11 review focuses upon the instant when the picture is 
taken -- when the signature is placed on the document. ") (reversing e¥~i~r 
6 
Reasonable Legal Inquiry 
In determining whether a party's legal investigation is objectively reasonable, 
courts consider factors such as the amount of time the party had to prepare the 
document, whether the document contains a plausible view of the law, whether the 
paper is filed by an attorney or by a pro se litigant, and the complexity of the legal and 
factual issues in question.31 Courts are generally unwilling to sanction litigants who are 
merely guilty of trying to stretch some "arguably" relevant legal principle,13 but parties 
who advance "wacky" legal theories may violate the Rule.34 Courts have imposed 
sanctions on parties who neglected to determine whether jurisdiction existed,35 who 
failed to investigate whether a contractual relationship existed,36 and who completely 
ignored fIrmly established precedent.37 Although Rule 11 permits parties to make "a 
application of continuing obligation requirement). For a list of cases on both sides 
of the "continuing obligation" debate, see Comment Note, General Principles 
Regarding Imposition of Sanctions Under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
95 A.L.R. FED. 107, 127·32 (1989). 
31 Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 812 F.2d 984, 988 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 
822 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1987), affd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 836 F.2d 
866 (5th Cir. 1988). 
33 Vairo, supra note 2, at 214·15. 
34 Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 
1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). See, e.g., Pawlowske v. Chrysler Corp., 
623 F.Supp. 569, 572·73 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd, 799 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(plaintiff argued that employer's removal of $568.37 from her wages, in compliance 
with IRS levy, was a violation of due process; court granted defendant summary 
judgment and sanctioned plaintiff). 
35 Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Group Systems International, 109 F.R.D. 594, 
597 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (sanctions imposed on attorney who filed motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction without researching relevant facts or their legal 
signifIcance ). 
36 Medical Emergency Servo Assocs. (MESA) S.c. v. Foulke, 633 F.Supp. 156 
(N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 844 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1988). 
37 Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1082 ("When counsel represent that something cleanly 
rejected by the Supreme Court is governing law, then it is appropriate to conclude 
that counsel are not engaged in trying to change the law; counsel either are trying to 
buffalo the court or have not done their homework. Either way, Rule 11 requires 
the court to impose a sanction. "). 
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good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law,"38 a 
pleader whose arguments are not clearly supported by existing law would be well 
advised to infonn the court that she is seeking a change in the law.39 
Sanctions 
Sanctions are a mandatory consequence of a Rule 11 violation,40 regardless of 
whether the violator has prevailed on the merits of the case.41 Even voluntary dismissal 
does not always relieve a party of responsibility for Rule 11 violations.4l 
An award of attorney's fees is merely the "preferred" means of response to a 
violation,43 and a district court "has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts 
of the case. "44 For example, a court may award an amount less than the aggrieved 
party's actual expenses and attorney's fees,45 or simply issue a reprimand to the 
offending attomey.46 Other solutions might include recommending that the state bar take 
disciplinary action,47 directing an attorney to attend continuing legal education courses,48 
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Refer to note 11 supra. 
39 Shaffer, supra note 7, at 5. 
40 Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 757 (1st Cir. 1988) 
("by using the phrase 'shall impose ... an appropriate sanction,' the new rule 
mandates the imposition of sanctions whenever an objective violation of its tenets is 
found.") (emphasis in original). 
41 Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 
1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). 
4l See, e.g., Id. at 1079. (plaintiff filed suit and voluntarily dismissed the action 
three days later; court required plaintiff to pay for round-the-clock work done by the . 
defendant's counsel during the intervening period). 
43 S. KAsslM, AN EMPIRICAL SlUDY OF RULE 11 SANCflONS 5 (1985). 
44 Advisory Committee Note, supra note 1, at 200. 
45 Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 1988). 
46 Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 467 n.5 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Schwarzer, 
Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule II: A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 201). 
47 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 125, (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). 
48 Id. 
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or requiring her to circulate a report of her misconduct throughout her law finn's 
offices.49 
The Purpose of Sanctions: Deterrence, Compensation or Punishment? 
Although federal courts have overwhelmingly recognized the deterrence rationale 
underlying Rule 11,so at least two other conceptions of Rule 11 's primary function have 
emerged. One emphasizes the Rule's cost-shifting or compensatory function, while the 
other stresses the punitive purpose of sanctions.SI Professor Arthur Miller, reporter to 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, champions the compensatory view. He views the 
Rule primarily as an alteration of the traditional American approach to costs (in which 
each party pays its own expenses) intended to bring it closer to the British system (in 
which the loser pays).51 The Rule itself lends some support to Professor Miller's view 
in its explicit provision for "reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of 
the ... paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee."s3 But Miller's critics have pointed 
out that Rule 11 is far from being a true cost-shifting provision, and that a purely 
49 Heuttig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 
1519, 1522-23 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (court required that copy of the memorandum 
opinion and order be delivered to every partner and associate of the sanctioned fum), 
affd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986). 
so See, e.g., Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3rd Cir. 
1986); Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1987); 
Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 1988); Kurkowski v. 
Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1987); Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 
(10th Cir. 1986); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (lIth Cir. 1987). 
SI Nelken, supra note 2, at 1323. 
51 Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted the New Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, 25, quoted in Nelken, supra note 2, at 
1323-24. 
S3 FED. R. CIv. P. 11. Refer to note 11 supra. 
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compensatory philosophy ignores the Rule's emphasis on attorney competence.54 Courts 
have agreed, refusing to view Rule 11 merely as a fee-shifting device. 55 
The Advisory Committee Notes also support a view of sanctions as a punitive 
measure: "[t]he detection and punishment of a violation of the signing requirement, 
encouraged by the amended rule, is part of the court's responsibility for securing the 
system's effective operation."56 Courts which prefer this punitive view may be more 
likely to impose nonmonetary sanctions, such as public reprimands, than courts which 
favor compensation. S7 The resulting impact upon attorneys' personal reputations and 
community standing furthers Rule 11 's deterrence function and is more effective than 
a simple cost-shifting device.58 It seems, therefore, that a compensatory approach is less 
likely to achieve the Rule's purpose of deterring abusive litigation than a punitive 
philosophy. 
54 Nelken, supra note 2, at 1324. 
55 See, e.g., Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 93 (3rd Cir. 
1987), in which the court reasoned as follows: 
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, bars enactment of substantive 
provisions masked as rulemaking. The Advisory Committee, aware of this 
limitation, consequently did not intend to effect a major change in the 
American Rule in the guise of expansive Rule 11 sanctions. . .. The goal 
of Rule 11, therefore, is not wholesale fee shifting but correction of 
litigation abuse. 
[d. at 483, A.L.R. Fed. at 101-02 (citation omitted). 
56 Advisory Committee Note, supra note 1, at 200 (emphasis supplied). 
S7 Comment, The Horizon of Rule 11: Toward a Guided Approach to 
Sanctions, 26 Hous. L. REv. 535, 567-68 (1989). 
58 See Nelken, supra note 2, at 1325. ("Cost shifting itself, however, is likely 
to be effective as a deterrent only to the extent that the costs incurred happen to 
outweigh the benefits derived . . . . In all other cases, we must assume that 
sanctions will be accepted as a cost of litigation and that the conduct will continue.) 
10 
RULE 11 AND STATE LAW 
By April 1990, at least nineteen states (including Virginia) had amended their 
rules of civil procedure to include a provision essentially identical to the new Federal 
Rule 11.59 Yet this does not necessarily mean that Rule 11 has met with widespread 
approval. Many states appear to believe that the Rule's requirements are too harsh, and 
have adopted provisions which mimic Rule II's language but which nonetheless differ 
in vital respects.60 California, apparently wary of adopting a tough sanctions law 
without testing it flrst, has taken a unique approach. It has adopted a "Rule 11 clone" 
but limited its application to two counties in the Los Angeles area.61 This experimental 
rule will only be in effect from July 1, 1988 to January 1, 1991, at which time the 
California Legislature will receive a report on whether the rule has achieved its goal of 
reducing court congestion.62 Because Federal Rule 11 has attracted so much criticism 
59 ARIz. R. CIv. P. l1(a); CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 447 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. 
R. CN. P. 11; DEL. R. CIv. P. 11; IDAHO R. CN. P. II(a)(1); ILL. CODE CN. P. § 2-
611; IOWA R. CIv. P. 80; JUN. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 60-211 (West 1990); LA. CODE CIv. 
PRoc. ANN. art. 863 (West Supp. 1990); MICH. CT. R. 2.114; MONT. R. CIv. P. 11; 
NEV. R. CIv. P. 11; N.D. R. CN. P. 11; OR. R. CIV. P. 17; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 
15-6-11 (Supp. 1989); UTAH R. CN. P. 11; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1; WASH. CIv. 
R. 11; WYO. R. CIv. P. 11. 
W See MIss. R. CN. P. 11 (establishes attorney's fees as legitimate sanction, but 
violations must be "willful" and sanctions are not mandatory); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-
824 (1989) (does not require a reasonable inquiry); S.C. R. CN. P. II(a) (does not 
require a reasonable inquiry or mandate sanctions, but does require an afflnnation 
that the parties have made a good faith attempt to settle); WIS. R. CN. P. 802.05 
(sanctions are not mandatory). 
61 CAL. CN. PRoc. CODE § 447 (West Supp. 1990) ("This section shall apply 
only in Riverside County and San Bernadino County. The Legislature flnds and 
declares that, in order to assess the impact of this section on a limited basis before 
making it applicable on a statewide basis, it is necessary for this section to be 
applicable for a limited period of time in those counties."). 
62 [d. The legislature has expressly charged the judicial council with 
determining whether the rule accomplishes the goals of (1) reducing caseload by 
20%, (2) reducing frivolous actions by 20%, and (3) increasing the early settlement 
of cases by 20%. [d., historical note. 
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for "unpredictability" and the spawning of excessive "satellite litigation,"63 such caution 
on the part of California and other states is understandable. It may even be somewhat 
disconcerting, in light of other states' wariness, that the Virginia General Assembly was 
willing to jump on the Rule 11 bandwagon with so little debate and so little dissent 
SANCTIONS IN VIRGINIA BEFORE § 8.01-271.1 
Before the adoption of Virginia's "Rule 11 clone," § 8.01-271.1, trial judges had 
relatively little power to impose sanctions for dilatory or abusive behavior. Federal 
courts had long possessed such power, even before Rule 11 was amended, because of 
the equitable doctrine (resting upon the inherent powers of the court) which allowed 
them to sanction litigants who "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for 
oppressive reasons."64 This principle functioned as an exception to the "American Rule," 
permitting courts to award expenses and attorney's fees to any litigant whose opponent 
acted in bad faith.65 Virginia explicitly rejected the federal doctrine, adhering closely 
to the "American Rule" principle that "attorney's fees are not recoverable by a 
prevailing litigant in the absence of a specific contractual or statutory provision to the 
contrary."66 Unlike their federal counterparts, Virginia judges were unable to impose 
monetary penalties upon parties who filed frivolous or abusive claims. 
Other means of deterring frivolous behavior existed before the passage of § 8.01-
271.1, including suits for malicious prosecution67 and abuse of process68 as well as 
63 See generally Schwarzer, supra note 4. 
64 Lannon v. Lee Conner Realty Corp., 238 Va. 590, 594, 385 S.E.2d 380, 
382-83 (1989). 
65 Advisory Committee Note, supra note 1, at 198. 
66 Lannon v. Lee Conner Realty Corp., 238 Va. 590, 594, 385 S.E.2d 380, 383 
(1989). 
67 A plaintiff claiming malicious prosecution in Virginia has the burden of 
proving (1) that the prosecution was set on foot by the defendant and that it 
terminated in a matter not unfavorable to the plaintiff; (2) that it was instituted by 
the defendant, or procured by his cooperation; (3) that it was without probable cause; 
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disciplinary action under the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility.69 These 
remedies, however, did not give judges the power to deal with improper behavior on 
their own authority. Instead, sanctioning decisions were made by a third party -- either 
the District Committee (in the case of ethics complaints)1O or the aggrieved party itself 
(which decided whether to sue for abuse of process or malicious prosecution). 
Furthermore, none of these remedies could be used to penalize a party who filed a 
frivolous suit in good faith. A litigant could not be liable in tort if his actions were 
not either "malicious" or bom of an "ulterior motive,'>11 and an attorney could not be 
guilty of ethical misconduct unless she "knowingly" advanced an unwarranted or 
malicious claim.72 Only subjective bad faith exposed attorneys to liability or discipline, 
allowing them to file unwarranted documents with little reason to fear punishment --
provided, of course, that they remained blissfully ignorant of their mistakes. 
and (4) that it was malicious. Cramer v. Crutchfield, 496 F. Supp. 949, 953 (E.D. 
Va. 1980), aftd, 648 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1981). 
68 A plaintiff claiming abuse of process in Virginia has the burden of proving 
(1) the existence of an ulterior motive on the part of the defendant and (2) an act in 
the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding. [d. at 
954. 
69 R. SUP. Cr. V A., part 6, § II. DR 7 -102(A) provides, in part: 
In representation of his client, a lawyer shall not: 
(1) File a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert a position, conduct a 
defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he 
knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass 
or maliciously injure another. 
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under 
existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be 
supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law. 
10 See generally R. SUP. CT. VA., part 6, § IV, ~ 13 ("Authority and Duties of 
the Council, the Standing Committee, District Committees and Bar Counsel. 
Investigation and Prosecution of Charges of Misconduct. "). 
71 Cramer v. Crutchfield, 496 F.Supp. 949, 953-54 (E.D. Va. 1980), aft d, 648 
F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1981). Refer to notes 67 and 68, supra. 
72 Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, R. SUP. Cr. VA., part 6, § II, 
DR 7-102(A)(2). Refer to note 69 supra. 
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The passage of § 8.01-271.1, nearly identical to Federal Rule 11, brought a 
dramatic change to this body of law.73 If applied as vigorously in Virginia as Rule 11 
has been applied in the federal courts, the new § 8.01-271.1 could very easily 
revolutionize litigation in Virginia as well. Yet because no Virginia appellate decision 
has interpreted § 8.01-271.1, an analysis of case literature yields little infonnation about 
judicial attitudes toward the new rule.74 It is for this reason that an analysis of § 8.01-
271.1 must be based upon empirical research. 
73 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1989). The section differs from Rule 11 
in some minor respects: it applies to oral motions as well as written ones 
(presumably because the general district courts and juvenile and domestic relations 
courts are not courts of record), and it requires that a pleader state his or her address 
only on the fIrst pleading filed with the court. The text of the rule is as follows: 
§ 8.01-271.1. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; oral 
motions; sanctions. -- Every pleading, written motion, and other paper of a 
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of 
record in his individual name, and the attorney's address shall be stated on 
the fIrst pleading filed by that attorney in the action. A party who is not 
represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper 
and state his address. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that 
(i) he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, (ii) to the best of his 
knowledge, infonnation and belief, fonned after reasonable inquiry, it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and (iii) it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, written 
motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed 
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or 
movant. 
An oral motion made by an attorney or a party in any court of the 
Commonwealth constitutes a representation by him that (i) to the best of his 
knowledge, infonnation and belief fonned after reasonable inquiry it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and (ii) it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed or made in violation of this 
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon 
the person who signed the paper or made the motion, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the 
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper or making of 
the motion, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
74 Refer to notes 8, 9 and 10 supra and accompanying text. 
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THE SURVEY 
Method 
In February of 1990, The Colonial Lawyer: A Journal of Virginia Law and 
Public Policy asked all Virginia's circuit court and general district court judges to 
participate in an anonymous mail survey. Every judge received a questionnaire 
describing two hypothetical fact situations, each culminating in a party's request for 
sanctions under § 8.01-271.1. In each case the judges were asked to indicate whether 
they believed the plaintiff's attorney violated § 8.01-271.1, whether they would grant 
the defendant's request for attorney's fees, what sort of other sanctions they might 
impose, and whether their responses would have been different under the law as it stood 
before § 8.01-271.1 came into effect. Judges were also asked to respond to additional 
questions addressing two broader issues -- their views 011 the purpose of § 8.01-271.1 
(whether they believed the primary function of the rule was compensation, deterrence 
or punishment), and their recent sanctioning activity (the number of motions they had 
encountered, the number they had granted and the number of times they had imposed 
sanctions on their own initiative). Each questionnaire was accompanied by a letter 
explaining the purpose of the survey, as well as a copy of § 8.01-271.1.75 
75 The questionnaire and cover letter are reprinted in an appendix to this 
article. The survey design and analysis was based partly upon the approach 
described in S. KAsslM, supra note 43 (analyzing a Federal Judicial Center mail 
survey of district court judges' attitudes toward federal Rule 11). Responses to four 
of the survey questions -- those asking judges to predict their colleagues' reactions 
(questions 3 and 9) and to choose a monetary sanction (questions 4 and 10) -- are 
not analyzed in this article because the insufficient rate of response did not permit 
the establishment of statistically valid conclusions. 
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Sample Size 
Of Virginia's 228 circuit court and general district court judges, 137 returned the 
questionnaire. This sample, representing 60.1 % of the target population, is considered 
an acceptable rate of response for a mail survey.76 
Objective Reasonableness vs. Subjective Bad Faith 
The ftrst part of the questionnaire was designed to test judges' opinions on the 
most substantial change effected by Rule 11 and § 8.01-271.1 -- the elimination of 
subjective bad faith as a requirement for imposing sanctions. Judges were asked to read 
two hypothetical fact situations and to indicate in each case (1) whether they believed 
the plaintiff's attorney's action was in violation of § 8.01-271.1, and (2) whether they 
would grant the defendant's request for attorney's fees if they were the judge in the 
case. Intended to present the judges with a suit interposed for an "improper purpose," 
the ftrst hypothetical situation77 involved an attorney who fIled a "strike suit"78 in an 
attempt to force a settlement.79 In response to this clear example of subjective bad 
76 E. BABBlE, THE !>RACOCE OF SOCIAL REsEARCH 335 (1979). 
77 FED. R. C1v. P. 11. Refer to note 11 supra. 
78 The United States Supreme Court has defined "strike suits" as suits fIled by 
parties "interested in getting quick dollars by making charges without regard to their 
truth so as to coerce corporate managers to settle worthless claims in order to get rid 
of them." Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371, reh'g denied, 384 
U.S. 915 (1966). 
79 The questionnaire's first hypothetical factual situation read as follows: 
Plaintiff sued Defendant Corporation for fraud. The complaint, signed and 
fIled by Plaintiff's Attorney, alleged the elements of fraud in only the most 
general terms. Plaintiff's Attorney wrote Defendant to suggest a settlement, 
but Defendant refused to negotiate and later prevailed on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
Defendant Corporation then brought a motion seeking an award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to Va. Code § 8.01-271.1. At the hearing, 
Defendant introduced as evidence the letter which Plaintiff's Attorney had 
written while seeking a settlement offer. The letter read, in part: "I realize, 
of course, that the merit of this suit is questionable at best. But I also 
realize that it will cost you far more to try this case than it will cost you to 
settle it." 
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faith, 122 judges (93.9%) said they believed the attorney's actions violated § 8.01-
271.1, and 116 judges (89.2%) said they would grant the defendant's request for 
attorney's fees. so 
No such general consensus appeared in judges' reactions to the second 
hypothetical situation, which was intended to test their views on whether "the absence 
of deliberate harassment"8! is a factor in detenmning a violation. The second situation 
involved an attorney who ftled a claim after the statute of limitations had run, relying 
upon his client's statements about the date of the accident rather than upon a fIrsthand 
investigation of medical records. Even after the defendant's counsel informed him of 
this mistake, the plaintiff's attorney refused to nonsuit the action.82 Only sixty-four 
80 Some judges did not respond to every question, and analyses of each set of 
responses are therefore based on slightly different sample sizes. 
8! Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987). 
82 The second hypothetical situation, based upon the facts of Van Berkel v. Fox 
Farm and Road Machinery, 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984), read as follows: 
Plaintiff, a farmer, brought a products liability action against 
Defendant, a manufacturer of farm machinery, on theories of 
negligence and strict liability. The complaint, signed by Plaintiff's 
Attorney, alleged that the accident took place on September 6, 1987. 
In actuality, the accident occurred on September 6, 1986, and when the 
suit was ftled on September 2, 1989, the two-year statute of limitations 
had already run. 
Defendant ftled its answer, alleging that the claims were barred by 
the statute of limitations. Defendant's Attorney served a demand for 
medical disclosure, and Plaintiff's Attorney complied. Defendant's 
Attorney then telephoned Plaintiff's Attorney and asked him to nonsuit 
the case, referring to proof in Plaintiff's medical records that the 
accident had taken place in 1986, not 1987, and that the action was 
therefore time-barred. Defendant's Attorney confIrmed this call by 
letter, also providing Plaintiff's Attorney with a copy of a 1986 
newspaper reporting that the accident took place on September 6 of 
that year. Plaintiff's Attorney did not respond to the requests for 
dismissal, and Defendant's Attorney ftled a motion for summary 
judgment (attaching copies of the letter and newspaper) and for 
recovery of attorney's fees under Va. Code § 8.01-271.1. 
At the hearing, Plaintiff's Attorney offered a personal affidavit 
stating that his client had told him that the accident had occurred on 
September 6, 1987, that he had found no reason to believe otherwise, 
and that he had acted in good faith. When asked what inquiry he had 
made before ftling the suit, Plaintiff's Attorney said he had talked to 
Plaintiff and his family members and had inspected copies of the 
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judges (48.9%) believed the plaintiff's attorney had violated § 8.01-271.1, and only 
sixty-one judges (46.6%) said they would grant the defendant's request for attorney's 
fees. Judges were thus much more willing to impose sanctions upon an attorney who 
acted in bad faith than upon an attorney who acted in good faith but who failed to 
conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry. This result suggests that many Virginia judges 
do not apply the objective standard of reasonableness established by the federal courts, 
but instead evaluate litigants' behavior according to a "subjective bad faith" test. 
Mandatory Imposition of Sanctions 
Judges' responses to the first two questions also helped gauge their attitudes 
toward another aspect of § 8.01-271.1: the rule's requirement that the courts "shall 
impose ... an appropriate sanction" upon parties and counsel who commit violations. 
The federal courts have interpreted the same language in Rule 11 to mean that every 
violation must result in a sanction of some sort, whether this be an award of attorney's 
fees or merely a verbal warning.83 Virginia's judges appear to agree; of the judges who 
found violations in the two hypothetical situations, only six (4.9%) and three (4.7%) 
said they would not impose any sanctions in the first and second hypotheticals, 
respectively. This suggests that most Virginia judges view the words "shall impose" 
as requiring the imposition of sanctions upon every violator of § 8.01-271.1. 
Sanctions Other Than Attorney's Fees 
Like Rule 11, § 8.01-271.1 accords Virginia's judges the power to craft "an 
appropriate sanction" which "may" include an award of attorney's fees. Survey 
machine's owner's manual. When asked why he had refused to 
nonsuit the action, Plaintiff's Attorney said that he had "a duty to 
protect the interests of my client." 
In Van Berkel, the plaintiff's attorney was sanctioned and ordered to pay $2,894.62 
to cover the defendant's costs, expenses and attorney's fees. Id. at 1251. 
83 Refer to notes 40-49 supra and accompanying text. 
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respondents who believed violations had occurred in a hypothetical situation were 
therefore invited to describe any sanctions, in addition to or instead of attorney's fees, 
which they would impose upon the plaintiff or his attorney if they were the judge in 
the case. Of the 116 judges who imposed sanctions in the fIrst hypothetical situation, 
eighteen (15.5%) recommended additional sanctions. (No judges recommended 
nonmonetary sanctions "instead of' attorney's fees.) Their suggested remedies included 
verbal warnings, lectures on legal ethics and public admonishments in court. Ten 
judges (8.6% of those imposing sanctions) said they would report the plaintiff's attorney 
to the State Bar District Committee, and two judges indicated that their complaints 
would be due to the attorney's violation of DR 7-102(A)(I) of the Virginia Code of 
Professional Responsibility.84 Two judges said they would impose sanctions upon both 
the plaintiff and his attorney in this case. 
Of the sixty-one judges who imposed sanctions in the second hypothetical 
situation, fourteen (22.9%) recommended additional sanctions. (No judges recommended 
nonmonetary sanctions "instead of' attorney's fees.) Their suggested remedies included 
requiring the plaintiff's attorney to attend a continuing legal education class on 
professional responsibility, making certain that the attorney had read and understood 
§ 8.01-271.1, a "public chewing-out in court" and an in-chambers lecture on "the 
courtesy and respect due to opposing counsel." Six judges (9.8% of those imposing 
sanctions) said they believed the plaintiff's attorney should be reported to the District 
Bar Committee, and one of these judges indicated that such a complaint would be based 
upon the attorney's violation of DR 7-102(A)(2) of the Virginia Code of Professional 
Responsibility.85 No judges said they would impose sanctions upon the plaintiff himself 
in this case. 
84 R. SUP. Cr. V A., part 6, § II. Refer to note 69 supra. 
8S [d. Refer to note 69 supra. 
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Would Responses Have Differed Under Prior Law? 
In connection with their reactions to the two hypothetical situations, judges were 
also asked whether they would have imposed sanctions under Virginia law as it stood 
before § 8.01-271.1 came into effect on July 1, 1987. Comparing the respondents' 
decisions under the old law with their decisions under the new rule helps show whether 
they believe § 8.01-271.1 has really changed the face of Virginia law. Based upon their 
reactions to each of the two hypothetical situations, respondents were divided into two 
groups: judges believing § 8.01-271.1 has changed the law (those who would have 
decided a different way under prior law) and judges believing the law has not changed 
(those who said they would have decided the same way under both new and prior law). 
Table 1 presents a breakdown of responses to these questions: 
TABLE 1 
Number and percentage of judges believing 
§ 8.01-271.1 has changed the law 
Judge's response 
Law has changed 
Law has not changed 
First situation 
("bad faith") 
87 (79.1%) 
23 (20.9%) 
Second situation 
("incompetence ") 
42 (38.2%) 
68 (61.8~) 
Note: the respondents identified as believing the law has changed included only 
judges who would have imposed sanctions under § 8.01-271.1 but not under prior 
law. No judges said they would have imposed sanctions under prior law but not 
under § 8.01-271.1. 
These data suggest two separate conclusions. First, many more judges believe 
that § 8.01-271.1 has changed law with respect to "bad faith" than with respect to 
mere incompetence. This implies that many Virginia judges do not believe § 8.01-271.1 
has effected the same kinds of momentous changes that Rule 11 has produced in the 
federal court system. This belief could be due to many factors, such as unfamiliarity 
with § 8.01-271.1, an unwillingness to blindly adopt federal standards, a reluctance to 
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abandon the bad-faith requirements of earlier remedies or a belief that prior law 
accorded judges extensive sanctioning powers. 
Second, the high percentage of judges who believe the law has changed with 
respect to "bad faith" suggests that most judges believe § 8.01-271.1 has significantly 
expanded their powers. Under prior law, parties who brought frivolous or abusive 
actions were usually penalized by someone other than the judge.86 Section 8.01-271.1 
altered this situation by providing judges with explicit authority to impose sanctions, 
eliminating any confusion as to the propriety of imposing sanctions on an attorney 
personally and establishing the shifting of expenses as a legitimate means of response. 
The data suggest that even judges who continue to apply a "subjective bad faith" 
standard recognize the significance of these broad new powers and are willing to take 
immediate and decisive action instead of relying upon others to implement rarely-used 
remedies. Even though § 8.01-271.1 may not have changed these judges' views of what 
is "frivolous" and what is not, they are now far more willing to impose sanctions for 
such behavior than they were before. 
Recent Sanctioning Activity 
In addition to the questions about the two hypothetical situations, judges were 
also asked to indicate (1) how many times in the last twelve months they had been 
confronted with a motion for sanctions under § 8.01-271.1, (2) how many of these 
motions they had granted, and (3) how many times in the last twelve months they had 
imposed sanctions on their own initiative. One hundred and twenty-nine judges 
responded to the first of these questions, and analysis of their estimates shows that the 
average respondent received 3.1 requests under § 8.01-271.1 in the past year. Out of 
all respondents, forty-three (33.3%) said they had not received any motions, seventeen 
(13.2%) had received one motion and sixty-nine (53.5%) had received two or more 
86 See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text. 
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motions. Seven judges reported having received at least ten motions, and one judge 
estimated his number of requests at approximately twenty-five. 
In response to the second question, judges who had encountered at least one 
motion indicated that they had granted a total of 112 requests under § 8.01-271.1 in 
the past year, for an average of 1.3 awards per judge. A comparison of the number 
of motions each judge had received with the number he or she had granted showed 
that these judges granted an average of 33.8% of all the motions they encountered. 
Only eleven judges (8% of the entire sample) reported having imposed sanctions 
on their own initiative at some point during the past twelve months. Ten of these 
judges had imposed sanctions once; only one judge reported having done so twice. 
The Rationale Behind the Rule 
To determine what rationales guide judges' attitudes toward § 8.01-271.1, the 
respondents were asked to indicate whether they believed the primary function of the 
new rule was (1) to compensate the aggrieved party, (2) to penalize the offending 
party, or (3) to deter future actions of a similar nature. Of the 127 judges who 
responded to this question, eighty-two (64.5%) expressed a belief that deterrence is the 
most important purpose of sanctions. Thirty-four judges (26.8%) believed compensation 
was the rule's primary function, while only eleven (8.7%) chose the punishment 
rationale. 
The Relationship Between Sanctioning Activity and Rationale 
Having found that most respondents favor a deterrence rationale, it was possible 
to explore the question of whether judges' rationales are related to their rulings on 
motions under § 8.01-271.1. For this analysis, each judge who had encountered at least 
one motion for sanctions was placed in one of two groups: "frequent sanctioners" (those 
who have granted 50% or more of the motions they have received in the last twelve 
months) and "infrequent sanctioners" (those who have granted less than 50% of the 
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motions they have received). These judges were also assigned to one of two groups 
according to whether they favored a deterrence or a compensation rationale.87 The 
comparison of these two groupings is summarized in Table 2: 
Preferred rationale 
Deterrence 
Compensation 
TABLE 2 
Comparison between judges' sanctioning 
activity and stated rationale 
"Frequent" 
sanctioners 
20 
16 
"Infrequent" 
sanctioners 
36 
11 
These figures show that 59.3% of judges favoring a compensation rationale, 
compared with only 35.7% of those favoring deterrence, are frequent sanctioners, a 
difference which is statistically significant.88 Judges who view § 8.01-271.1 as a fee-
shifting device therefore seem more likely to impose sanctions than those who believe 
the rule should be used primarily to discourage frivolous or abusive tactics. This result 
makes sense. Judges with a compensatory philosophy need only certify that the rule 
has been violated, causing some degree of hardship to the aggrieved party, in order to 
impose a sanction. The range of circumstances triggering sanctions under this standard 
is thus broader than that arising out of a deterrence philosophy, which would require 
some indication that an award might help prevent future violations. Judges who seek 
to deter abusive behavior might also be more sensitive to the danger of discouraging 
attorney creativity, and they would thus impose sanctions only when they were certain 
to avoid creating a "chilling effect." In other words, judges favoring compensation need 
only determine whether the case before them demands a remedy, while judges favoring 
87 The group of 11 judges favoring the punishment rationale was too small for 
the establishment of statistically valid conclusions and was therefore excluded from 
consideration in this analysis. 
88 Chi-square = 4.11, P < .05. 
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deterrence must also consider the effect sanctions might have on future litigation. It 
follows that compensation-oriented judges are more likely to grant requests for 
attorney's fees under § 8.01-271.1.89 
The Relationship Between Judicial Attitudes and Experience 
Thus far, analysis of the survey data has shown that many Virginia judges do 
not apply Rule 11 standards when interpreting § 8.01-271.1. Yet who exactly are these 
judges? Are they primarily those who have had little experience with litigation under 
§ 8.01-271.1? In an attempt to answer these questions, the respondents were divided 
into two categories: "more experienced" Gudges who have encountered two or more 
motions under § 8.01-271.1 in the last twelve months) and "less experienced" Gudges 
who have received either one motion or none at all). To determine which of these 
judges agreed with Federal Rule 11 standards, each respondent was also placed in one 
of two other categories: those who had recommended sanctions in both hypothetical 
sanctions, and those who had not recommended sanctions in both situations. The results 
of this analysis are summarized in Table 3: 
TABLE 3 
Comparison between judges' experience with § 8.01-271.1 
and their decisions in hypothetical situations 
Imposing sanctions in: 
both situations 
one or neither situation 
"more experienced" 
judges 
36 
33 
"less experienced" 
judges 
19 
41 
These figures show that 52.2% of "more experienced" judges said they would 
impose sanctions in both hypothetical situations, compared with only 31.7% of "less 
89 Professor Nelkin has also recognized that a compensatory philosophy can 
make sanctions more palatable and therefore more likely to occur. See Nelkin, supra 
note 2, at 1324. 
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experienced" judges, a difference which is statistically significant.!lO Because federal 
courts' interpretations of Rule 11 would dictate the imposition of sanctions in both the 
"bad faith" situation and the "inadequate inquiry" situation, these data suggest that 
Virginia judges who have had more experience with § 8.01-271.1 are more familiar with 
federal standards and are more likely to apply them in deciding whether to award 
sanctions. This is a logical conclusion. Section 8.01-271.1 mimics the wording of 
Federal Rule 11, and it would be natural for attorneys to cite federal authority while 
arguing a motion for sanctions before a Virginia judge. Judges who have entertained 
many such motions are thus more likely to apply § 8.01-271.1 according to federal 
standards instead of according to their own personal interpretations. In other words, 
judges who encounter motions under § 8.01-271.1 learn more about federal 
interpretations and are more willing to follow them. 
This conclusion is supported by another look at the importance of judicial 
experience, this time in relation to judges' preferred sanctioning rationales. This 
analysis divided judges into two categories based upon their view of § 8.01-271.1 's 
primary function: all judges who believed deterrence was most important were placed 
in one group, and all judges who favored the compensation or punishment rationales 
were placed in another. These categories were compared to determine how many judges 
in each group were "more experienced" and "less experienced," and the results of this 
comparison are summarized in Table 4: 
TABLE 4 
Comparison of judges' experience with 
their sanctioning philosophy 
Preferred rationale 
Deterrence 
Compensation or punishment 
!lO Chi-square = 5.52, P < .025. 
"more experienced" 
judges 
25 
51 
18 
"less experienced" 
judges 
31 
29 
These figures show that 73.9% of "more experienced" judges believe deterrence 
is the most important function of § 8.01-271.1, compared with only 51.7% of "less 
experienced" judges, a difference which is statistically significant.91 Because deterrence 
is the only rationale expressly articulated by the federal rules themselves,92 and because 
the federal courts have overwhelmingly recognized Rule 11 's deterrence function,93 
Virginia judges who prefer a deterrence view of § 8.01-271.1 are agreeing with the 
great weight of federal authority. Because so many "more experienced" judges have. 
adopted a deterrence philosophy, it is logical to conclude that Virginia judges who 
encounter more motions are more likely to hear and accept arguments based upon the 
rationales adopted by the federal courts. In other words, judges who encounter more 
motions learn more. 
This inference, coupled with the tendency of experienced judges to impose 
sanctions in both hypothetical situations (see Table 3), leads to yet another conclusion: 
as time passes, more and more Virginia judges will come to apply Federal Rule 11 
standards when dealing with § 8.01-271.1. Nearly a third of the judges responding to 
the survey have never encountered a motion for sanctions, and it is probable that many 
nonrespondents have also been relatively unexposed to the issues surrounding § 8.01-
271.1. Because judges who have encountered motions for sanctions tend to agree with 
Federal Rule 11 standards, many judges who currently appear to disagree with federal 
interpretations may very well change their minds after dealing with a few more requests 
for attorney's fees. Eventually most Virginia judges will probably adhere to a relatively 
uniform sanctioning standard, which will probably be a mirror image of the one 
developed by the federal courts. 
91 Chi-square = 6.86, p < .001. 
92 Advisory Committee Note, supra note 1, at 199. 
93 See cases cited supra note 50. 
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CONCLUSION: HOW TO AVOID SANCTIONS 
Although the state of Virginia law with respect to § 8.01-271.1 is still uncertain, 
the results of this survey suggest that many judges already treat motions under the new 
rule in much the same way that federal judges treat motions under Rule 11. 
Furthermore, it appears that Virginia judges will be invoking Federal Rule II standards 
with greater and greater frequency in the years to come. It is in consideration of these 
conclusions that we offer the following suggestions which may be helpful to attorneys 
practicing civil law in Virginia: 
1. Before filing any pleading, recognize that your own subjective good faith 
will not protect you from sanctions. 
2. Realize that most judges believe § 8.01-271.1 has changed the law, and 
that even judges who continue to evaluate your acts according to a 
"subjective bad faith" standard are more likely to sanction you. 
3. Before filing any document, confirm that its purpose is not merely to 
harass, delay, or injure the opposing party. 
4. If your client asks you to file documents for some improper purpose, 
inform your client that she, too, is subject to sanctions, both monetary 
and otherwise. 
5. Conduct a personal investigation into facts of your case before filing any 
document. Be sure to confirm your client's version of the facts through 
other sources, if possible. 
6. Conduct a thorough investigation of the legal issues involved. If you 
hope to make an argument for the reversal or extension of existing law, 
be sure to inform the court of your intention. 
7. Recognize that the court may sanction you either upon motion or on its 
own initiative. 
27 
8. If you are forced to file hurriedly in order to avoid a time bar, perform 
the steps described above immediately after filing your document. 
9. Realize that the judge may not yet have encountered a motion under 
§ 8.01-271.1 and may not know how its federal counterpart, Rule 11, 
has been applied. (This could be to your disadvantage; for example, if 
the judge views § 8.01-271.1 primarily as a cost-shifting device, she is 
more likely to sanction you.) If you want the judge to apply federal 
standards, be sure to educate her. 
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APPENDIX 
Date, 1990 
The Honorable ___ , Judge 
Address 
Dear Judge __ : 
The Colonial Lawyer: A Journal of Virginia Law and Public Policy published 
by the students of William and Mary law school, is conducting a study of judges' views 
and practices regarding Va. Code § 8.01-271.1, which became effective on July 1, 1987. 
Interest in abuses of the litigation process has intensified over recent years, and the new 
§ 8.01-271.1 may very well represent Virginia's response to these concerns. In order 
to gauge the effect which this provision has had upon litigation in the Commonwealth 
over the past two and a half years, The Colonial Lawyer would like to request your 
assistance as a participant in this study -- participation which should not require more 
than minutes of your time. 
Enclosed is a questionnaire describing two hypothetical cases. Each case 
culminates in a party's request for sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1. The 
questionnaire asks you to react to these situations and to answer some additional 
questions regarding your views on the new Code provision. For your convenience, we 
have also attached a copy of the statute. 
Inevitably, descriptions of situations such as these cannot provide all the details 
that might be needed for making conclusive judgments. We have, therefore, tried to 
express our questions more tentatively, asking for your views, inclinations and opinions 
in light of the facts presented. 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed envelope at your 
earliest convenience. All responses will be anonymous; the questionnaires are neither 
numbered nor marked, and the published article will make no reference to the opinions 
of any individual judge or court. 
It would be very helpful if you would return your questionnaire within two 
weeks. Thank you for your time and consideration. 
Sincerely, 
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VA. CODE ANN. SECTION 8.01-271.1 
(Cum. Supp.1989) 
§ 8.01-271.1. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; oral 
motions; sanctions.-- Every pleading, written motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his 
individual name, and the attorney's address shall be stated on the fIrst pleading flIed by 
that attorney in the action. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign 
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certifIcate by him that (i) he· 
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, (ii) to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifIcation 
or reversal of existing law, and (iii) it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
If a pleading, written motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless 
it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or 
movant. 
An oral motion made by an attorney or a party in any court of the 
Commonwealth constitutes a representation by him that (i) to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifIcation 
or reversal of existing law, and (ii) it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed or made in violation of this rule, 
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed the paper or made the motion, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount 
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the flIing of the pleading, motion, or 
other paper or making of the motion, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
First Hypothetical Situation: Plaintiff sued Defendant Corporation for fraud. 
The complaint, signed and filed by Plaintiff's Attorney, alleged the elements of fraud 
in only the most general terms. Plaintiff's Attorney wrote Defendant to suggest a 
settlement, but Defendant refused to negotiate and later prevailed on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
Defendant Corporation then brought a motion seeking an award of attorney's fees 
pursuant to Va. Code § 8.01-271.1. At the hearing, Defendant introduced as evidence 
the letter which Plaintiff's Attorney had written while seeking a settlement offer. The 
letter read, in part: "I realize, of course, that the merit of this suit is questionable at 
best. But I also realize that it will cost you far more to try this case that it will cost 
you to settle it." 
Questions: 
1. Do you think Plaintiff's Attorney's action is in violation of Va. Code § 8.01-
271.1? (Circle one) 
YES NO 
2. If you were the judge in this case, would you grant Defendant's request for 
attorney's fees? 
YES NO 
3. In this case, approximately what percentage of judges in your district (if you are 
a General District Judge) or circuit (if you are a Circuit Judge) do you think 
would grant Defendant's request for attorney's fees? 
---_% 
4. If you answered YES to question 2, how much would you be inclined to order 
Plaintiff's Attorney to pay Defendant in this case? (check one) 
an amount less than all reasonable expenses and attorney's fees 
all reasonable expenses and attorney's fees 
all reasonable expenses and attorney's fees, plus some form of 
supplemental damages 
5. In addition to or instead of expenses and attorney's fees, would you impose any 
other sanctions against Plaintiff or Plaintiff's Attorney, and if so, what would 
they be? (please explain) 
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6. Would you have imposed any sanctions on Plaintiff's Attorney under the law as 
it stood before § 8.01-271.1 came into effect (that is, before July 1, 1987)? 
YES NO 
Second Hypothetical Situation: Plaintiff, a farmer, brought a products liability 
action against Defendant, a manufacturer of farm machinery, on theories of negligence 
and strict liability. The complaint, signed by Plaintiff's Attorney, alleged that the 
accident took place on September 6, 1987. In actuality, the accident occurred on 
September 6, 1986, and when the suit was filed on September 2, 1989, the two-year 
statute of limitations had already run. 
Defendant filed its answer, alleging that the claims were barred by the statue of 
limitations. Defendant's Attorney served a demand for medical disclosure, and 
Plaintiff's Attorney complied. Defendant's Attorney then telephoned Plaintiffs Attorney 
and asked him to nonsuit the case, referring to proof in Plaintiff's medical records that 
the accident had taken place in 1986, not 1987, and that the action was therefore time-
barred. Defendant's Attorney confirmed this call by letter, also providing Plaintiff's 
Attorney with a copy of a 1986 newspaper reporting that the accident took place on 
September 6 of that year. Plaintiff's Attorney did not respond to the requests for 
dismissal, and Defendant's Attorney filed a motion for summary judgement (attaching 
copies of the letter and newspaper) and for recovery of attorney's fees under Va. Code 
§ 8.01-271.1. 
At the hearing, Plaintiffs Attorney offered a personal affidavit stating that his 
client had told him that the accident had occurred on September 6, 1987, that he found 
no reason to believe otherwise, and that he had acted in good faith. When asked what 
inquiry he had made before filing the suit, Plaintiffs Attorney said he had talked to 
Plaintiff and his family members and had inspected copies of the machine's owner's 
manual. When asked why he had refused to nonsuit the action, Plaintiff's Attorney said 
that he had "a duty to protect the interests of my client." 
Questions: 
7. Do you think Plaintiff's Attorney's action is in violation of Va. Code § 8.01-
271.1? (Circle one) 
YES NO 
8. If you were the judge in this case, would you grant Defendant's request for 
attorney's fees? 
YES NO 
9. In this case, approximately what percentage of judges in your district (if you are 
a General District Judge) or circuit (if you are a Circuit Judge) do you think 
would grant Defendant's request for attorney's fees? 
---_% 
10. If you answered YES to question 8, how much would you be inclined to order 
Plaintiff's Attorney to pay Defendant in this case? (check one) 
an amount less than all reasonable expenses and attorney's fees 
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all reasonable expenses and attorney's fees 
all reasonable expenses and attorney's fees, plus some form of 
supplemental damages 
11. In addition to or instead of expenses and attorney's fees, would you impose any 
other sanctions against Plaintiff or Plaintiff's Attorney, and if so, what would 
they be? (please explain) 
12. Would you have imposed any sanctions on Plaintiff's Attorney under the law as 
it stood before § 8.01-271.1 came into effect (that is, before July 1, 1987)? 
YES NO 
Additional Questions: 
13. In general, what do you see as the primary function of sanctions under § 8.01-
271.1 ? (please rank in order of importance, using 1 to indicate the most 
important and 3 to indicate the least important) 
to compensate the aggrieved party 
to penalize the offending party 
to deter future actions of a similar nature 
14 How many times in the last 12 months have you been confronted with a motion 
for sanctions under § 8.01-271.1? 
15. In how many cases did you grant the request for attorney's fees? 
16. How many times in the last 12 months have you, on your own initiative, 
imposed sanctions under § 8.01-271.1? 
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VIRGINIA'S NATURAL DEATH ACT: 
IS IT USEFUL TO iNDIVIDUALS IN A PERSISTENT VEGETATWE STATE? 
Deborah A. Ryan 
As scientific advances make it possible 
for us to live longer than ever before, 
even when most of our physical and mental 
capacities have been irrevocably lost, 
patients and their families are increasingly 
asserting a right to die a natural death 
without undue dependence on medical technology 
or unnecessarily protracted agony - in short, 
a right to die with dignity.l 
INTRODUcrION 
One of the most controversial medical, moral and legal issues of our time is 
whether patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) have a legal right to die. liThe 
most commonly cited estimate of the number of PVS patients in the United States is 
5,000 to 10,000, and this number can be anticipated to significantly increase in the 
future, especially when coupled with their increased longevity. III This article will 
discuss this issue in four sections. The first section will define what it means to be in 
a PVS in an attempt to reconcile some of the common misconceptions associated with 
this condition. The second section will discuss the rights of such patients to discontinue 
treatment as well as the rights of a surrogate to act on their behalf. The third section 
will explore Virginia's Natural Death Ace to see if it effectively deals with PVS 
patients. Finally, this article will suggest possible solutions to this ongoing controversy. 
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985). 
2 Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the 
Facts Straight), 18 HASTINGS Cmm=.R REP. 27, 31 (Feb.-Mar. 1988). 
3 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988 & Supp. 1989). 
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PVS DEFINED 
PVS patients are said to be in a state of "pennanent unconsciousness".4 They 
have lost all cognitive functions, they do not experience anything.s These individuals 
are not simply demented, they are amented.6 They are not merely retarded, they have 
lost all mental capacities. However, these patients are not tenninally ill' in the 
traditional sense. PVS individuals commonly live five, ten, twenty years or more if 
care is maintained,s although they are not able to enjoy many of the pleasures nonnally 
associated with living. "There is virtually no chance that such a [PVS] patient will ever 
recover consciousness. ,,9 
Given these circumstances one might wonder whether PVS patients should be 
considered alive at all. They are not totally brain dead. Their brain stem, which 
controls such functions as breathing and reflexes, is still intact. Yet they have lost the 
very capacities that make us human and separate us from other animals. Many 
commentators argue that because of this loss of "personhood," PVS patients should be 
considered brain dead.1O As it stands now, the Unifonn Detennination of Death Act 
4 Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting The 
Facts Straight), 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27, 28 (Feb.-Mar. 1988) (citing to 
PREsIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STIJDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL 
AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, DECIDING TO FoREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 171-92 (March 
1983». 
Id. at 31. 
6 Id. at 28. Amented is defined as having no mind and demented is defined 
as deprived of reason. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 50, 373 (5th ed. 1982). 
, Tenninal illness is defined as an illness which occurs at or contributes to 
the end of life. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1418 (5th ed. 1982). 
Cranford, supra note 4, at 31. 
9 Annas, Do Feeding Tubes Have More Rights Than Patients?, 15 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 26 (Feb. 1986). 
10 Smith. Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death. 71 CORNELL L. REv. 850. 858 
n. 39 (1986). 
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does not include PVS patients in its definition of death. 11 Thus, PVS patients are not 
legally dead,12 but they experience none of the joys of being alive. The question that 
logically follows then is, should such individuals be given the "right to die"? 
SHOULD PVS PATIENTS HAVE TIlE RIGHT TO DIE? 
The best known "right to die" case is that of Karen Ann Quinlan.13 Karen was 
a twenty-two year old woman in a PVS. The doctors believed that she would die very 
soon if taken off her respirator.14 The court held that her physicians could pull the 
plug on her respirator at the request of her parents. IS However, when her father was 
asked if he wanted her nasogastric feeding tube removed, he replied, "Oh no, that is her 
nourishment. "16 As a result, Karen lived for nine years in a PVS. 
The single most troubling issue in determining if PVS patients have the "right 
to die" is that in many cases they will only die if their artificial hydration and nutrition 
11 The Uniform Determination of Death Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 271 (Supp. 1985), 
provides: "An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of 
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of 
the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be 
made in accordance with accepted medical standards." 
12 The Virginia Code, § 54.1-2972, defines legal death to be either (1) 
irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and spontaneous cardiac functions, or 
(2) irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions and spontaneous respiratory 
functions. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1~2972 (1988). 
13 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
14 Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 655. 
IS Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 671-72. 
16 Ramsey, Prolonged Dying: Not Medically Indicated, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 
14, 16 (Feb. 1976). 
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(AN&H) system is withdrawn.17 Inherently, there seems to be something morally and 
ethically wrong with denying any patient food and water. It is somehow different from 
withholding other medical treatment. 18 When a respirator or similar life support system 
is disconnected, a patient is simply allowed to die naturally, and the underlying disease 
is the cause of death. However, when AN&H is withdrawn, the patient is being starved 
to death, and an active and unnatural killing is taking place.19 Thus, the fear is that 
society will embark down a slippery slope toward the endorsement of euthanasia or 
suicide as the solution rather than simply allowing a person to die a natural death.20 
Although the inherent morality of this theory may be very appealing, the harsh 
reality of carrying it through has led many courts to decide in favor of withholding or 
withdrawing AN&H.21 Unfortunately, the courts seem to reach this result because of 
their desire to do the right thing and fail to apply any clear and consistent legal 
principles to guide us. The determination that allowing PVS patients to forego AN&H 
is the right thing seems to be based on two basic premises. 
First, it has long been recognized that patients who are competent to determine 
the course of their therapy may refuse any and all interventions proposed by others, as 
17 Artificial nutrition and hydration (AN&H) is the provision of food and water 
through medical intervention. There are two basic procedures which provide the 
required nutrients. The first is a nasogastric tube which is inserted through the nose 
into the stomach. The second is a gastrostomy tube (G-tube) which is surgically 
inserted directly into the stomach. See generally, Lynn & Childress, Must Patients 
Always Be Given Food and Water?, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17 (Oct. 1983). 
18 See generally, Derr, Why Foods and Fluids Can Never Be Denied, 16 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28 (Feb. 1986). 
19 Id. at 28. 
20 See generally, Wikler, Not Dead, Not Dying? Ethical Categories and 
Persistent Vegetative State, 18 HAsTINGS CENTER REP. 41 (Feb.-Mar. 1988). 
21 See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); McConnell v. 
Beverly Enterprises, 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989); Delio v. 
Westchester County Med. Center, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); In re 
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 
Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 
(1985). 
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long as their refusals do not seriously hann or impose unfair burdens upon others.22 
Second, it is assumed that few people would opt to continue such an existence if given 
the choice, because their lives would not be worth living.23 However, these premises 
provide little assistance in the absence of a pre-written document, such as a living will,2A 
because PVS patients are incompetent by definition. This leaves courts in the 
unenviable position of having to balance the underlying assumption that many of these 
patients would choose to forego AN&H if they were competent against the state's 
interest in the sanctity of life.25 
Perhaps some of the biggest strides in dealing with this issue were made by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in deciding In re Conroy.26 Claire Conroy was a single, 
eighty-four year old woman with serious and irreversible physical and mental 
impairments. She was legally incompetent and had only minimal cognitive capacities. 
Her only living relative, a nephew, was appointed her legal guardian. Her nephew filed 
suit to have her AN&H, which was provided through a nasogastric tube, withdrawn. 
The court declared termination of any medical treatment, including AN &H, for 
incompetents lawful so long as certain procedures are followed.27 In reaching this 
22 See Lynn & Childress, supra note 17, at 18. 
23 Wikler, supra note 20, at 41. 
24 Living will is a common term used to refer to a patient's prior written 
instruction that a physician withhold life-sustaining procedures in certain 
circumstances. For a detailed discussion of living wills, see Dufraine, Living Wills -
A Need for Statewide Legislation or a Federally Recognized Right?, 3 DEf. C. L. 
REv. 781 (1983). 
25 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 
741, 370 N.E.2d. 417, 425 (1977). The court asserts four countervailing state 
interests; 1) preservation of life; 2) protection of third parties; 3) prevention of 
suicide; and 4) maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Id. at 
741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. 
26 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). 
27 Annas, When Procedures Limit Rights: From Quinlan to Conroy, 15 
HASTINGS CENlCR REP. 24, 25 (Apr. 1985). 
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decision, the court specifically rejected some of the most common arguments set forth 
by the proponents of mandatory AN&H. The court found no difference between 
allowing a person to die and the hastening of the death process by tenninating 
treatment;2B between withholding and withdrawing treatment;29 between extraordinary and 
ordinary care;3O and between AN&H and other life sustaining procedures.31 Based on 
the foregoing analysis, the court set out a three part test to apply when the patient is 
incompetent and unable to express his/her own desires. First, if the individual's wishes 
can be detennined, no further inquiry is required.32 The patient's wishes must be 
granted based on his/her common law right to refuse any medical treatment.33 
Alternatively, when the patient's wishes are not discernible, the court set forth two "best 
interests" tests. The "limited objective test" allows life sustaining treatment to be 
withdrawn if there is some evidence the patient would refuse treatment and the burdens 
imposed by the treatment outweigh the benefits the patient receives.34 The "pure 
objective test" is to be applied when there is absolutely no evidence about what the 
patient would want. This test requires that the burden imposed clearly outweigh the 
benefits to the patient and the unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life must be 
such that the effect of administering treatment would be inhumane.35 The severity of 
i 
2B Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _, 486 A.~ 1209, 1233-34 (1985). 
29 [d. at _, 486 A.2d at 1234. 
30 Id. at _, 486 A.2d at 1234-35. 
31 Id. at _, 486 A.2d at 1235-36 .. 
32 Id. at _, 486 A.2d at 1229-30. The court notes that the patient's wishes 
could be embodied in a "living will," deduced from prior oral statements, deduced 
from religious beliefs, a consistent pattern of conduct, or a durable power of 
attorney. Id. 
33 Id. at _, 486 A.2d at 1226. 
34 Id. at _, 486 A.2d at 1232. 
3S Id. 
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the third test is based on the court's belief that "[w]hen evidence of a person's wishes 
or physical or mental condition is equivocal, it is best to err, if at all, in favor of 
preserving life. "36 
While the court has certainly made progress in setting forth clear legal standards, 
there are still problems with its approach. First, the procedural requirements are 
narrowly tailored for nursing home patients.37 Thus, the legal standards are far too 
rigorous to be applied generally. More importantly, the tests themselves are severely 
flawed. The self-determination test is both legally and morally sound, but there will 
rarely be enough evidence to apply it. While logically sound, the "best-interests" tests 
are inapplicable to PVS patients because these patients can't experience anything. 
Therefore, it is impossible to discern how any medical intervention could benefit or 
harm them.38 In these instances, the only justifiable reason to sustain their life is "for 
their loved ones and the community at large."39 Presently, it is generally accepted that 
if the parents feel strongly that no AN&H should be provided, and the caregivers are 
willing to comply, the law should not stand in the way.40 However, this principle offers 
no assistance when family members and caregivers disagree. Some courts have dealt 
with this by allowing the patient to be moved to a hospital that would honor the 
family'S wishes.41 This "compromise" puts an extra strain and certainly an added 
financial imposition on a family that has already endured a great deal. Perhaps a better 
36 [d. at _, 486 A.2d at 1233. 
37 [d. at _, 486 A.2d at 1240-43. 
38 Lynn & Childress, supra note 17, at 18. 
39 [d. 
40 [d. (citing to PREsIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR TIIE STUDY OF EnucAL PROBLEMS IN 
MEDIONE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, DECIDING TO FoREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT 171-196 (March 1983». 
41 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E. 2d 626 
(1986). 
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solution would be to apply the benefits versus burdens analysis to the family. In a very 
real sense, the family members are the ones suffering. It is they who are incurring the 
severe financial burden,42 and the emotional strain. It therefore seems more logical that 
this analysis, if at all, be applied to the family members, who are indeed burdened, 
rather than the PVS patient who can experience nothing. 
Another commonly asserted argument against withholding AN&H is that it leads 
to a horrible and gruesome death and not the dignified experience we associate with 
"natural death. "43 The symptoms associated with this dying process are a dried mouth, 
lips parched and cracked, tongue swollen and cracked, eyes sunk back into their orbits, 
cheeks hollow, nose bleeding and stomach dried out causing dry heaves and vomiting.44 
While seemingly justifiable, these concerns are wholly unwarranted. With adequate 
nursing care and good oral hygiene, PVS patients will not incur these horrible effects.4!l 
Further, only family members, who might witness the manifestation of these symptoms, 
would need protection because PVS patients cannot experience pain and suffering.46 
42 Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the 
Facts Straight), 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27, 31 (Feb.-Mar. 1988). "The cost of 
maintaining [PVS] patients varies substantially by state, type of institution and 
support systems. [d. In general, the costs range from $2,000 to over $10,000 a 
month. [d. 
43 See generally, Battin, The Least Worst Death, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13 
(Apr. 1983). 
44 Brophy, 398 Mass. at 444 n.2, 497 N.E.2d at 641 n.2 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
4!l Cranford, supra note 42, at 31. 
46 Cranford, supra note 42. "No conscious experience of pain and suffering is 
possible without the integrated functioning of the brain stem and cerebral cortex. 
Pain and suffering are attributes of consciousness, and PVS patients like Brophy do 
not experience them. Noxious stimuli may activate peripherally located nerves, but 
only a brain with the capacity for consciousness can translate that neural activity into 
an experience. That part of Brophy's brain is forever lost." [d. (citing to Brophy v. 
New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., Amicus Curiae Brief, American Academy of 
Neurology, Minneapolis, MN (1986». 
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Finally, the withdrawal of AN&H will result in death in one to thirty days, making it 
a fairly quick process.47 
IS THE VIRGINIA CODE EFFECfIVE IN DEALING WITH PVS PATIENTS? 
The Virginia Natural Death Acf' allows a competent adult to make a written 
declaration49 directing the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures in the 
event such person should have a tenninal condition.5O In the absence of a written 
declaration directing withdrawal, life-prolonging procedures may be withdrawn from a 
comatose or incompetent patient, with a terminal condition, provided there is agreement 
between the attending physician and the court-appointed guardian or certain other 
individuals.sl A terminal condition is defined by the Act to mean "a condition caused 
by injury, disease or illness from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
(i) there can be no recovery and (ii) death is imminent."51 This seemingly restrictive 
and vague definition would provide little assistance to a PVS patient. 
The first judicial interpretation of the Act construed the terminal condition 
provision narrOWly. The case, decided in 1986, was Hazelton v. Powhatan Nursing 
Home. s3 Mrs. Hazelton had a malignant brain tumor which caused her to slip into an 
irreversible coma. The attending physician, her husband and two adult children all 
agreed that her AN &H, supplied through a nasogastric tube, should be withdrawn. 
However, the Powhatan Nursing Home, where Mrs. Hazelton was staying, refused to 
47 [d. 
48 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988 & Supp. 1989). 
49 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983. 
50 See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982. 
SI VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986. 
51 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983. 
S3 Chancery No. 98287 (Cir. Ct. of Fairfax County, Va., Aug. 29, 1986). 
42 
honor the attending physician's request. The Circuit Court of Fairfax County held that 
Mrs. Hazelton's illness satisfied the tenninal condition provision and ordered withdrawal 
of the nasogastric tube.54 The court relied on the testimony of four medical experts 
in determining if the Act's two-part test defining a terminal condition was met.55 While 
all four experts agreed that "there could be no recovery," there was dissension as to 
whether the "death must be imminent requirement" had been satisfied. 56 The court 
determined that Mrs. Hazelton met the "death must be imminent" requirement because 
her illness would lead to death within a few months regardless of treatment. This 
narrow reading of the provision does not help PVS patients who could live for several 
years.57 In fact, the court specifically stated that the statute does not apply to "those 
who are in a coma but are not afflicted with a disease or other treatment that will 
specifically lead to their death. "58 The Act further prohibits "any affmnative or 
deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of 
dying."59 This tenninology certainly opens the door for an abundance of litigation as 
to whether the withdrawing or withholding of AN&H ends life in a way other than the 
natural process of dying.60 The Act, as it now reads, helps a very small group of 
people and fails to aid those with the greatest need. Arguably, PVS patients who are 
54 Hazleton, slip op. at 1-2. 
ss [d. at 11-12. 
56 [d. at 5. 
57 Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the 
Facts Straight), 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27, 31 (Feb.-Mar. 1988) (citing to Cranford, 
Termination of Treatment in the Persistent Vegetative State, Seminars in Neurology 
4(1): 36-44 (Mar. 1984». "The longest reported, well documented, survival (without 
recovery) was thirty-seven years, III days." [d. 
58 Hazleton, slip. op. at 6. 
59 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990. 
60 See generally, Derr, Why Foods and Fluids Can Never be Denied?, 16 
HASTINGS CEN"rnR REP. 28 (Feb. 1986). 
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forced to live a life devoid of human experiences,61 for several years,62 placing 
tremendous financial63 and emotional stress on their families have a greater need for the 
"right to die" than someone who will die shortly regardless of the court's decision. 
The Act is also of little utility in that it requires the attending physician and the 
family or guardian to agree.64 It has already been recognized that under such 
circumstances of agreement, the law should not stand in the way.65 Instead, the law 
needs to provide guidance when these parties are in dispute. The Act is clearly 
ineffective in achieving this goal. 
Further, the written declaration sections66 is virtually devoid of value. Based on 
the doctrine of informed consent, individuals have a basic common law right to refuse 
any medical treatment, so long as it does not place undue burdens on others.67 The 
written declaration provision only allows competent individuals to refuse life-prolonging 
medical procedures if they fall within the Act's narrow definition of terminal condition. 
The Act specifically purports not to impair existing common law rights68 and therefore 
there is no practical reason to draft a provision that falls far short of those rights. 
The Virginia courts have had little opportunity to apply the Act to date. 
Unfortunately, the restrictiveness of the Act coupled with the vagueness of the "terminal 
61 Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the 
Facts Straight), 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27, 28 (Feb.-Mar. 1988). 
62 [d. at 31. 
63 [d. at 31-32. 
64 V A. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986. 
65 Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and Water?, 13 
HASTINGS CEN1F.R REP. 17, 18 (Oct. 1983) (citing to PREsIDENT's COMMISSION FOR THE 
SWDY OF ETIlICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, 
DECIDING TO FoREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 171-96 (March 1983». 
66 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983. 
67 See generally, Lynn & Childress, supra note 65. 
68 V A. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2992. 
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condition" provision will leave them with little guidance when the need arises. This 
situation could result in a contradictory body of case law and necessitates the 
broadening of the Act to provide a unifonn approach to "right to die" decisionmaking 
within the state.69 Similar problems have arisen in other states with restrictive natural 
death acts.70 This is largely because courts are ruling, with increasing frequency, that 
common-law and constitutional rights to refuse treatment supersede restrictive legislative 
directives.71 The courts recognize that the patient's rights are not unconditional72 and 
must be balanced against the State's interest in life. However, most court's have found 
it "difficult to conceive of a case in which the State could have an interest strong 
enough to subordinate a patient's right to choose not to be sustained in a persistent 
vegetative state. "13 Therefore, in order to be of any use to the courts and citizens of 
Virginia, the Act should be redrafted to be both more comprehensive and more 
conclusive. Specifically, a redrafted statute needs to include PVS patients, a group the 
current statute virtually overlooks. 
69 Note, The "Terminal Condition" Condition in Virginia's Natural Death Act, 
73 VA. L. REv. 749, 766 (1987). 
70 The restrictive natural death acts in California and Washington caused the 
courts in those states to create their own ad hoc solutions to the complex non-
treatment cases before them. Id. at 763-66. 
71 Note, A Necessary Compromise: The Right to Forego Artificial Nutrition and 
Hydration Under Maryland's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, 47 MD. L. REv. 1188, 
1205 (1988). 
72 The privacy right involved, therefore, 
cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, 
it is not clear to us that the claim 
asserted by some amici that one has an 
unlimited right to do with one's body 
as one pleases bears a close relation-
ship to the right of privacy previously 
articulated in the Court's decisions. 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
13 In re Peter, 180 N.J. 365, _, 529 A.2d 419, 427 (1987). 
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PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
There are two possible resolutions to the current ineffectiveness and 
inconsistencies in the law with respect to the rights of PVS patients. The fIrst involves 
redefIning the legal defInition of death to include those who are in a state of permanent 
unconsciousness. The permanent unconsciousness of an individual is sometimes referred 
to as neocortical death.74 A redrafting of the statute would allow the withholding or 
withdrawal of all life-support systems, including AN &H, from PVS patients without 
74 Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 850, 875 
(1986). Smith proposes a model statute which reads as follows: 
Neocortical Death 
Sec. 1. For the purpose of this statute, "neocortical death" means the 
irreversible loss of consciousness and cognitive functions. An 
individual who has sustained neocortical death is legally dead. A 
determination of neocortical death under this section must be made 
in accordance with reasonable medical standards and procedures. 
Sec. 2. After a medical determination of neocortical death, the individual 
may be biologically maintained if the individual has executed a 
written instrument [in accordance with the jurisdiction'S living will 
statutes or procedures] expressing the desire to be maintained on 
artifIcial life-support systems in the event of neocortical death. If 
the individual has made no such prior written declaration, the 
family, next of kin, or guardian may provide for biological 
maintenance. 
Sec. 3. If neither the individual (by a prior written directive) nor the 
family, next of kin, or guardian elects to provide for biological 
maintenance, all artificial life-support systems may be withheld and 
terminated, and the provision of nourishment and fluids may be 
withheld or ceased. As an alternative to the withholding or 
cessation of nourishment and fluids as a means of terminating 
biological existence, the family, next of kin, or guardian may 
request injection of a chemical in a quantity sufficient to cause 
biological death. The chemical must be administered in accordance 
with reasonable medical procedures. 
Sec. 4. No person,. firm, or organization shall be subject to criminal 
responsibility or civil liability for terminating the biological 
existence of a neocortically dead individual by any of the methods 
or procedures authorized in Section 3 (withholding or terminating 
artifIcial life-support systems, cessation of nourishment and 
hydration, or lethal chemical injection). 
Id. at 875-76. 
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controversy. In fact, if the revised statute followed the existing death statutes, the 
patient's wishes for tennination of treatment would not have to be ascertained.7S 
There are several reasons why including neocortical death in the definition of 
legal death makes sense. First, as stated earlier, many courts are already finding a way 
to allow the withdrawal of AN&H from PVS patients, due to the severity of their 
affliction.76 The revised statute would simply provide clear and consistent reasoning for 
the decisions that many state courts have already been reaching. Thus, unnecessary 
litigation could be avoided. Also, the traditional benefits versus burdens analysis used 
in "right to die" cases breaks down when applied to PVS patients.77 The late Senator 
Jacob Javits stated, while himself suffering from a tenninal illness, that "[b]ecause 
medical technology can now sustain life even when the ability to think is gone, society 
must change its laws."78 Finally, it is virtually impossible to know with any certainty, 
in the absence of a prior written directive, what the wishes of a person devoid of 
mental capacities would be. Classifying these patients as legally dead would relieve the 
courts from their duty to do the impossible and protect individuals from the emotional 
and financial stress generally incurred in litigating the issue. 
The revised statute would also rebut some of the most common arguments 
asserted by proponents of mandatory AN&H. For example, one argument is that 
withdrawing AN&H is actively killing the PVS patient as opposed to allowing him to 
die a natural death.79 The conflict of whether it was the underlying disease or starvation 
7S [d. at 860 n. 44. 
76 See cases cited supra note 21. 
77 Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and Water, 13 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 18-19 (Oct. 1983). 
78 Smith, supra note 74, at 860 n.44 (citing to Former Senator Pleads for 
Dignified Death, Am. Med. News, Oct. 25, 1985, at 13, col. 2). 
79 See generally, Derr, Why Foods and Fluids Can Never be Denied, 16 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28 (Feb. 1986). 
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that caused the patient's death80 would be resolved because the patient would be 
declared legally dead before the AN&H was withdrawn. Moreover, many commentators 
argue that the withdrawing of AN&H from PVS patients, will allow society to embark 
down a "slippery slope"81 which will eventually lead to active euthanasia of physically 
and mentally handicapped individuals. This fear could be eliminated by the proposed 
redefinition of legal death.82 Under the new statute, only individuals who were in a 
state of permanent unconsciousness, who had lost all cognitive functions, and who could 
experience nothing would be classified as legally dead. The courts should still apply 
the benefits versus burdens analysis to anyone who was severely handicapped but could, 
to some extent, experience joy and pain. 
One of the purposes of law is to provide clear and consistent guidelines for 
members of society to abide by. The current ad hoc decisionmaking by courts,83 with 
regard to the rights of PVS patients and their families, is of little use in this regard. 
The result is costly and time consuming litigation for families that have already endured 
a great deal of heartache and expense. Further, the current definition of death has other 
negative implications. As the law reads now, death benefits cannot be received by PVS 
patients or their families, vital organs cannot be donated to save someone who might 
be able to lead a full life84 and murderers can go unpunished for years, until a PVS 
80 Steinbock, The Removal of Mr. Herbert's Feeding Tube, 13 HASTINGS CENTER 
REP. 13, 14-16 (Oct. 1983). 
81 See generally, Wikler, Not Dead, Not Dying? Ethical Categories and 
Persistent Vegetative State, 18 HASTINGS CEN-rnR REP. 41 (Feb.-Mar. 1988). 
82 Smith, supra note 74, at 861 n.51. 
83 Note, The "Terminal Condition" Condition in Virginia's Natural Death Act, 
73 VA. L. REv. 749, 766 (1987). 
84 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 
741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977). The state's interest in sanctity of life would 
certainly be promoted by allowing vital organs to be donated to individuals who 
might otherwise die. [d. 
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victim is pronounced dead.85 These grave effects could all be avoided by adopting a 
revised statute which defines legal death to include neocortical death. 
The first proposal assumes that no one would want to remain in a state of 
permanent unconsciousness. This assumption, while clearly supported by some,86 may 
not be unanimously backed. Smith87 proposes that we allow some PVS patients to be 
biologically maintained. This exception, although compassionately designed, will make 
the inclusion of PVS patients among the legally dead look like "definitional 
gerrymandering. "88 The expansion of legal death must not simply be a means to a 
desired end, it must be based on independent medical grounds. Therefore, if PVS 
patients are to be considered legally dead, it is imperative that they are treated as such 
in every respect. However, if the redefinition of death seems unconscionable to many, 
there is an alternative solution. The "living will"89 doctrine could be expanded both in 
its content and its availability. The Virginia Natural Death Act90 only allows a living 
will to mandate the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures in the case 
of a terminal condition. Thus, the written directive section91 must be expanded to allow 
individuals to carry out their constitutional and common law right92 to refuse any 
medical treatment. The legislature could achieve this by revising the Act to allow a 
living will to include the denial of life-prolonging measures for the patient who loses 
85 Smith, supra note 74, at 872 n.128. 
86 [d. at 858 n.39. 
87 [d. at 856-77. 
88 Wikler, supra note 81, at 44. 
89 See generally, Dufraine, Living Wills - A Need for Statewide Legislation or 
A Federally Recognized Right?, 3 DET. C.L. REv. 781 (1983). 
90 VA. CODE ANN. § § 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988 & Supp. 1989). 
91 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983. 
92 Lynn & Childress, supra note 77, at 18. 
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all cognitive abilities and enters a state of pennanent unconsciousness. Further, in order 
to be truly effective, the availability of living wills must be brought to the public's 
attention. Members of society should be encouraged to draft a living will just as they 
are encouraged to vote or encouraged to become organ donors. Unfortunately, 
expanding the use of living wills would not achieve the level of consistency that 
redefining death provides. However, it is certainly a positive step in protecting the 
rights of PVS patients and a viable solution for those who are not ready to include such 
individuals among the legally dead. 
CONCLUSION93 
PVS patients do not enjoy any of the experiences that make us human. Yet as 
long as they are biologically maintained, their families are prevented from getting on 
93 In 1988, the Supreme Court of Missouri overruled a trial judge's decision to 
allow the withdrawal of AN&H from Nancy Cruzan at the request of her parents. 
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 
(1989). Nancy Cruzan was a twenty-five year old woman in 1983 when she was 
involved in a one car accident which caused her to stop breathing for approximately 
12 to 14 minutes. [d. at 411. The deprivation of oxygen caused severe brain 
damage. Nancy Cruzan lies in a persistent vegetative state today. 
Approximately one month after the accident, on February 7, 1983, a 
gastrostomy feeding tube was implanted. [d. At that time there was still hope for 
recovery. Today, that hope is gone. "The evidence is clear and convincing that 
Nancy will never interact meaningfully with her environment again." [d. at 422. 
Yet, it is predicted that Nancy "will live a life of relatively nonnal duration if 
allowed basic sustenance." [d. at 419. 
The Missouri Supreme Court held that Missouri's strong interest in life 
outweighs any right that Nancy's guardians have to refuse medical treatment on her 
behalf. [d. at 426. The court reached this decision despite the fact that when other 
courts have considered the issue, "nearly unanimously, those courts have found a 
way to allow persons wishing to die, or those who seek the death of a ward, to 
meet the end sought." [d. at 413. 
The Cruzans appealed to the United States Supreme Court and the case was 
argued on December 6, 1989. However, a decision has hot yet been handed down. 
This is the first "right to die" case to reach the Supreme Court and the decision 
should help to define the rights held by PVS patients and their families. Although, 
as with the regulation of the right to have an abortion perfonned, great discretion 
may be given to the individual states in this area. 
At this point, the effect of the Supreme Court's decision on Virginia's 
Natural Death Act is unknown and any speculation on the issue is beyond the scope 
of this article. The purpose of this article is merely to point out that the Act is 
currently of little value to many PVS patients and their families. 
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with their lives and incur thousands of dollars in medical bills every month. Most 
people would not opt to remain in such a condition, yet the law is presently unclear as 
to how they can avoid it. The Natural Death Act of Virginia is both too restrictive and 
too vague to aid PVS patients. The statute should be revised in one of two ways. It 
should either include PVS patients among the legally dead or guarantee them their rights 
through expansion of the living will doctrine. Due to the length and severity of their 
condition, PVS patients, possibly more than any other group, need and deserve the 
"right to die" with dignity. 
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AIDS AND DISCRIMINA nON IN THE WORKPLACE: 
HOW WILL THE VIRGINIA COURTS RULE? 
Anne D. Bowling 
INTRODUCTION 
In June of 1989, Nation's Business magazine reported the results of a study 
conducted by the Philadelphia Commission on AIDS and the Greater Philadelphia 
Chamber of Commerce on the attitudes about and the impact of AIDS in small 
businesses in Philadelphia.) The results were disturbing. Only four percent of the 
enterprises surveyed had company policies on AIDS. Further, 75 percent of the 
companies knew little, if anything, about any of their legal obligations towards 
employees with AIDS. Forty percent responded that they would limit contact between 
the employee with AIDS and his co-workers. Sixteen percent indicated that they would 
encourage employees with AIDS or HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus or Human 
T-Cell Lymphotrophic Virus Type nD2 infection to resign. Thirty percent said that they 
would disclose to the infected employee's co-workers confidential information 
concerning his infection without the employee's consent.3 
The Fall 1988 issue of The Colonial Lawyer included an article ("1988 article") 
authored by Thomas Sotelo,4 which investigated whether under the available regulations 
and cases, the Rehabilitation Act of 19735 ("Rehabilitation Act") afforded protection to 
individuals suffering from the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), AIDS-
Singer, AIDS Concerns for Business; Includes related articles on principles 
for the workplace and information about AIDS, NATION'S Bus., June 1989, at 75, _. 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 12-35. 
3 Singer, supra note 1, at _. 
4 Sotelo, AIDS: Handicap or Not?, 17 COL. LAW. 1 (1988). 
5 29 U.S.c. § 794 (1983). 
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related Complex (ARC), or infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV),6 
and whether this protection could be extended to those perceived as being at a high risk 
of having AIDS, because of their association with certain "high-risk" groupS.7 If the 
Rehabilitation Act's formulation of "handicapped individual" is found to be applicable 
to these persons, its antidiscrimination policies also apply to them. In the 1988 article, 
the author concluded that persons suffering with the forms of AIDS listed above indeed 
fit within the Rehabilitation Act's definition of handicapped, and may use the act as a 
defense against employment discrimination.8 
The purpose of this paper is to examine developments in the law since the 1988 
article, both at the federal and state levels. Although AIDS victims may be deemed 
handicapped individuals under the Rehabilitation Act and the attendant regUlations, the 
human rights laws of the states may differ significantly in structure and degree of 
protection offered the handicapped individual. In all cases, there are many factors to 
be taken into account in deciding whether the situation in any given case actually fits 
into the scope of the statutes. On the state level, this paper will focus primarily on 
Virginia's Rights of Persons with Disabilities Law,9 and its probable interpretation in 
an AIDS-related employment discrimination case. 
The examination of Virginia's laws protecting the rights of AIDS victims will 
be looked at in the context of general facts about the nature of AIDS, ARC, mv 
infection, and the spread of the disease. Developments in the federal law since School 
6 Throughout the article, "HJV" is used to refer to Human T-Cell 
Lymphotrophic Virus Type III (HIV-III) as well as Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 
both recognized as AIDS causing agents. 
7 Homosexuals, blacks, and hispanics are groups who have been hit the 
hardest by the spread of the syndrome. Singer, Helping People with AIDS Stay on 
Job, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1989, § 1, at 28, col. 1. See also Kosterlitz, 'Us: 'Them' 
and AIDS, 20 NAT'L. J. 1738, 1741-42 (1988). 
8 
9 
Sotelo, supra note 4, at 13. 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.5-1 to -46 (1988 & Supp. 1989). 
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Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline,1O and Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School 
District11 will also be examined. Finally, it examines the probable construction of 
Virginia's antidiscrimination statute in light of the interpretations courts of other states 
have given their own human rights statutes. 
THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 
Epidemiologists believe that the AIDS virus was actively spreading in the United 
States by the late 1970's;12 early cases were first documented in 1979.13 Originally 
considered a disease limited to homosexual males and intravenous drug users, AIDS has 
spread into the general population striking individuals in other "lower risk" groupS.14 
The mv virus, which causes AIDS, is extremely fragile, and must gain access 
to the bloodstream of its intended victim. IS It has spread in four ways: (1) through 
sexual intercourse with persons infected by the AIDS virus, (2) sharing needles used to 
inject intravenous drugs, (3) injections of contaminated blood products, as in blood 
transfusions,t6 or (4) to a child from an infected mother during birth, or from breast 
10 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (A teacher with tuberculosis met the statute's 
requirements for a handicapped individual, and could not be removed from 
employment because of a relapse of her disease. The fact that the disease is 
contagious does not, in and of itself, remove it from the protection of the 
Rehabilitation Act). 
11 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (A child who was demonstrating 
symptoms of ARC was designated "otherwise qualified" for the purposes of being 
allowed to remain in class). 
12 N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1989, at B7, col. 1. 
13 Comment, AIDS and Employment Discrimination Under the Federal 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Virginia's Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20 
U. RICH. L. REv. 425, 425 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Aids and Employment 
Discrimination]. 
14 Kosterlitz, 'US,' 'Them' and AIDS, 20 NAT'L J. 1738, 1740 (1988). 
IS J. LANGONE, AIDS: THE FACTS 73 (1988). 
16 [d. at 71. 
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feeding. 17 All evidence has indicated that the virus is not spread through casual 
contact. 18 Once in the bloodstream, the virus attacks white blood cells and disrupts the 
functioning of the immune system.19 Two types of blood cells, B-cells and T -cells, 
work together to find and destroy unfamiliar substances (antigens) in the bloodstream.2D 
The B-cells attach themselves to antigens and produce multiplying antibodies, or 
"memory cells," that will attack antigens of the same type. 
T -helper cells recognize any familiar antigens that enter the bloodstream, and 
prompt the B-cells to immediately begin production of the antibodies needed to fight 
them.21 T-suppressor cells limit antibody production, and ensure that the B-cells only 
make antibodies to attack the appropriate antigens.22 
HIV impairs the functioning of T-helper cells, rendering them incapable of 
recalling substances to which the B-cells have antibody-producing abilities. Since the 
17 Id. at 73-74. 
18 Id. at 75-77. In February, 1986, the New England Journal of Medicine 
reported the results of a study of the possible spread of AIDS among family 
members. Families were singled out for the study, since the contact between family 
members is closer and more intimate than in any other instances that may be 
considered "casual contact." "[T]he study involved 101 people -- parents, children, 
siblings, and other relatives of 39 AIDS victims --each of whom had lived with the 
patient for at least three months ... ," while the victims were infected. Id. at 75-
76. Although there was significant evidence of close contact -- for instance, ninety-
two percent of the family members surveyed shared the same shower or bathtub as 
the AIDS patient, fifty percent drank from the same drinking glasses, and thirty 
seven percent slept in the same bed as the patient -- only one person out of the 101 
studied had positive results for the presence of antibodies when later tested. This 
single victim was a five year old girl, whom doctors believe was infected since 
birth, as her mother had AIDS. Id. at 76. 
19 Comment, Aids and Employment Discrimination, supra note 13, at 426-28. 
2D Id. at 427. 
21 Id. It is essential for the T-helper cells to remind the B-cells of their 
capacity for making the antibodies, since B-cells neither recognize antigens on their 
own, nor remember that they are able to make the applicable antibodies. Id. 
22 Id. 
55 
B-cells are unable to recognize antigens, they fail to produce antibodies, and the body 
cannot protect itself from viral and fungal invasions.23 
Infection with mv tends to have three basic manifestations. The most severe 
is full-blown AIDS, the final stage of an AIDS virus infection.24 A diagnosis of AIDS 
involves laboratory evidence of the presence of the AIDS virus (HN infection), as well 
as an "indicator disease. illS Also referred to as opportunistic diseases, these invade the 
body once the immune system is suppressed by the AIDS virus.26 Symptoms of AIDS 
itself include swollen glands, unexplained loss of appetite, weakness, recurring fever and 
common infections, night sweats, persistent and unexplained diarrhea, continuous dry 
coughing, shingles, and skin rashes and spots.27 Evidence indicates that HIV attaches 
to the central nervous system as well as the immune system causing a range of 
consequences "from forgetfulness to dementia."28 AIDS is usually fatal when confronted 
in its full-blown state. ARC (AIDS-Related Complex) is a milder form of the disease, 
and is generally not life-threatening.29 Further, ARC mayor may not ever develop into 
full-blown AIDS.30 
23 Id. 
24 LANGONE, supra note IS, at 8. 
lS Comment, Protecting Persons with AIDS from Employment Discrimination, 
77 Ky. L.J. 403, 404-05 (1988-89) [hereinafter, Comment, Persons with AIDS]. 
26 Sotelo, AIDS: Handicap or Not?, 17 COL. LAW. I, 2 (1988). Two of ten-
noted opportunistic diseases associated with AIDS are pneumocystis carinii 
pneumonia, and Kaposi's sarcoma. Id. Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia is a form of 
pneumonia that causes weakness, fever, labored breathing, and a dry, hacking cough. 
LANGONE, supra note IS, at 14. Kaposi's sarcoma is a usually non-fatal skin cancer 
that produces painful purple lesions that cover the body. Id. at 16. 
27 LANGONE, supra note IS, at 14-16. 
28 Id. at 14. 
29 Id. at 12. 
30 Id. 
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The third possible manifestation of the disease is an often-asymptomatic infection 
with the HN virus.31 A person in this category could either test virus-positive, with 
detectable antibodies in the blood, or antibody-positive, with a positive serological test 
result, and never develop the symptoms of AIDS or ARC.32 The infection caused by 
HIV proceeds slowly, and it is impossible to predict the number of people who are 
HIV-positive and will develop AIDS or ARC.33 It is estimated that for every current 
AIDS patient, there are 25 to 75 people who are carrying the virus.34 It is also 
estimated that 1.5 million Americans are currently in this category.35 
THE REHABILIT A nON ACf OF 1973 
The Rehabilitation Act of 197336 ("Rehabilitation Act") provides for equal 
opportunities for benefits of federally-funded programs and federal agencies, to those 
persons who qualify as "individual[s] with handicaps.'037 Such a person is defined by 
31 Comment, AIDS and Employment Discrimination, supra note 13, at 430. 
See also LANGONE, supra note 15, at 10. The only symptom that tends to manifest 
itself at this stage of the syndrome is a short-term, mononucleosis-type disorder, 
characterized by swollen glands. [d. 
32 Comment, AIDS and Employment Discrimination, supra note 13, at 430. 
33 LANGONE, supra note 15, at 10-11. Infected persons without symptoms have 
developed detectable antibodies within two to eight weeks after being exposed to the 
virus, though antibodies have also taken up to six to eight months to appear. Even 
with the presence of the antibodies, the victim may remain free of symptoms for a 
considerable amount of time (weeks or years), depending on how the disease was 
transmitted. [d. at 11. 
34 Koch, Arlington AIDS Program to Focus on Education, The Washington 
Post, May 12, 1988, Virginia Weekly, § vi. See also Singer, Helping People with 
AIDS Stay on Job, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1989, § 1, at 28, col. 1. 
35 LANGONE, supra note 15, at 10. 
36 Pub.L. No. 93-112, Title V, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1983». 
n The Rehabilitation Act states, in pertinent part, that: 
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the 
United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, 
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the Rehabilitation Act as either an individual "who has a physical or mental impairinent 
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities,"38 "has a 
record of such an impairment,"39 or "is regarded as having such an impairment."40 For 
shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under 
any program or activity conducted by any Executive 
agency or by the United States Postal Service. 
29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (Supp. 1989). 
38 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B)(i) (Supp. 1989). 
Regulations promulgated under this statute define "physical or mental 
impairment" as: 
any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more 
of the following body systems: neurological; ... hemic 
and lymphatic; skin .... 
45 C.F.R. § 1232.3(h)(2)(i) (1989). All of these apply to AIDS or ARC patients. 
"Major life activities" are defined as: 
functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, 
walking, seeing; hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 
45 C.F.R. § 1232.3(h)(2)(ii) (1989). 
39 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1989). 
Regulations define this to apply to a person who: 
has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a 
mental or physical impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities. 
45 C.F.R. § 1232.3(h)(2)(iii) (1989). 
40 29 U.S.C.A .. § 706(8)(B)(iii) (Supp. 1989). An individual regarded as having 
a physical or mental impairment: 
(A) has a physical or mental impairment that does not 
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a 
recipient as constituting such a limitation; (B) has a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of 
others towards such impairment; or (C) has none of the 
impairments defmed in 
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the purposes of employment discrimination, persons whose handicaps involve drug or 
alcohol abuse are specifically excluded from coverage. These are the only such 
limitations.41 
The Rehabilitation Act does not apply to all persons who have a disability. 
Under the plain language of the Rehabilitation Act, protection to individuals with a 
handicap is limited to those who are "otherwise qualified."42 In the 1988 article, the 
author argued that individuals with AIDS, ARC, or who are carriers of the HIV virus 
are all protected under the Rehabilitation Act.43 Persons afflicted with AIDS fit into the 
criteria of having a physical or mental impairment, due to the symptoms they endure.44 
They meet the second criteria, substantial limitation of major life activities, through their 
impaired ability to fight disease, need for constant medical attention, and endurance of 
the stigma associated with having AIDS.4!l Persons with ARC, or who are asymptomatic 
carriers of the virus, may meet the handicapped criteria as persons with "a record of 
paragraph (h)(2)(i) of this section but is treated by a recipient 
as having such an impairment. 
45 C.F.R. § 1232.2(h)(2)(iv) (1989). 
41 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. 1989). 
42 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (Supp. 1989). Regulations define "qualified 
handicapped person" as: 
(1) ... , a handicapped person who, with reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 
the job or assignment in question. 
45 C.F.R. § 1232.3(i)(I) (1989). In cases involving contagious diseases, "reasonable 
accommodation" is concerned with eliminating the risk to other employees or others 
working closely with the AIDS victim. But see 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(C) (Supp. 
1989). 
43 Sotelo, AIDS: Handicap or Not?, 17 COL. LAW. 1, 4-9 (1988). 
44 [d. at 6-7. 
4!l [d. at 7. See also J. LANGONE, AIDS: THE FACJ'S, 71-72 (1988). 
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such impainnent. "46 The author also cited cases that indicated that courts also tended 
to support the definition of AIDS as a handicap within the scope of the Rehabilitation 
Act.47 despite the fact that AIDS is not listed as a handicap in the statute. 
Other authors have agreed with the view that AIDS is a handicap.48 The only 
exception to inclusion of AIDS in the Rehabilitation Act appears to be in limited 
circumstances. where bona fide health and safety risks render employment of an AIDS 
victim imprudent.49 In these conditions. the employee will not be considered "otherwise 
qualified" to participate in the employment in question. and thus the Act is inapplicable. 
Cases decided since the publication of the 1988 article continue to point towards 
the idea that. were the question before the Supreme Court. the Court would rule that 
AIDS is indeed a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act so The holdings in the two 
cases principally cited in the 1988 article. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School 
46 Sotelo. supra note 43. at 8. This applies whether or not the carrier actually 
has symptoms; the criteria is more based on the ways that the individual is perceived 
by other persons. [d. 
47 [d. at 9-12. 
48 See, e.g .• Comment. Protecting Persons with AIDS from Employment 
Discrimination. 77 Ky. L.J. 403. 407-17 (1988-89); Comment. AIDS and Employment 
Discrimination Under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Virginia's Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities Act. 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 425. 433-45 (1985). 
49 Examples of these situations involve "sensitive jobs." positions where the 
employee is charged with the safety of others. or is involved with an intellectually 
demanding or particularly intricate line of work. The AIDS virus' attack on the 
central nervous system has been shown to cause dementia in the victim, and the 
slow process of deterioration often makes detection of any mental impairment 
difficult. See generally Hentoff, The Rehabilitation Act's Otherwise Qualified 
Requirement and the AIDS Virus: Protecting the Public from AIDS-Related Health 
and Safety Hazards. 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 571 (1988). 
so The following does not purport to represent a comprehensive survey of all 
the new federal case law since the Fall 1988 issue of the Colonial Lawyer. For the 
purposes of this article. these cases are included to indicate the apparent direction 
that case law has taken. 
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District,51 and School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline52 both turned on the 
presence or absence of a significant risk of infection to others. The couns in those 
cases held respectively that absent a significant risk of others contracting the illness 
(ARC in Thomas and tuberculosis in Arline), the individual will be classified a 
"qualified individual," and thus protected under the Rehabilitation Act. In the Arline 
decision, the Supreme Coun endorsed the American Medical Association's formulation 
of the finding of facts necessary to balance whether or not an individual with a 
contagious disease is "otherwise qualified" for the employment in question.53 The Arline 
decision is cited extensively in Chalk v. United States District Court Central District 
of California.54 This case, similar to Arline, involved a situation in which a teacher was 
removed from his position due to his contagious disease. However, Arline involved 
tuberculosis, and the Supreme Coun was careful not to rule on the applicability of the 
case's holding to the AIDS virus.55 In Chalk, the Ninth Circuit Coun of Appeals 
51 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
52 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
53 [d. at 288. The Coun held that: 
D 
this inquiry should include: "[findings of] facts, based 
on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical 
knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the 
disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk 
(how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity 
of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) 
and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted 
and will cause varying degrees of harm." 
[d. (citing Brief for the American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae 19). 
54 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988). 
The case does not present, and we therefore do 
not reach, the question whether a carrier of a 
contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered 
to have a physical impairment, or whether such a 
person could be considered solely on the basis of 
contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by 
the Act. 
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utilized the standards articulated in Arline for finding a significant risk, to overturn the 
District Court's refusal to issue a preliminary injunction reinstating Chalk to his teaching 
position. 56 
Another case that used the Arline standards to deal with AIDS in the classroom, 
though in the context of a student's right to attend class, is Martinez v. School Board 
of Hillsborough County, Florida.S1 This case involved the segregation of a five-year-
old mentally retarded girl, who was isolated from the rest of her special education class, 
because of the school board's fear that the AIDS virus with which she was infected 
would present a risk of contamination to the other students. The girl was not toilet 
trained, and habitually sucked her fingers.~ The court took an approach similar to that 
in Arline in interpreting Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The 11 th Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that the risk involved in having the child in the classroom was easily 
accommodated by seating her apart from the other students, and therefore, the risk did 
not rise to the level of "significant."59 
The situation involved in Martinez, where it was found that the risk of AIDS 
infection was merely a "remote theoretical possibility,"60 may be compared to an 
employment setting, in an attempt to predict how a court might rule in the latter 
situation. It is clear that, with the exception of a few lines of work where AIDS 
Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n. 7. 
56 Chalk, 840 F.2d at 71 0-11. 
S1 861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1988). 
~ [d. at 1503-04. 
59 [d. at 1505-06. The court divided the process of determining a significant 
risk into steps. First, the "trial judge must determine whether the individual is 
'otherwise qualified,'" based on the criteria set forth in Arline. [d. at 1505. Then, 
even if the individual with a handicap is not deemed "otherwise qualified," the court 
must determine if the handicapped person could be made so through reasonable 
accommodation. [d. 
60 [d. at 1506. 
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constitutes a valid threat to either those around the victim or the victim himself,61 
segregation and discriminatory treatment will not be permitted, and the Arline criteria 
will classify the AIDS victim as "otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act. 
TIIE VIRGINIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 
Like the majority of state statutes on human rights, Virginia's Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities Law ("Disabilities Law") does not specifically address AIDS or any 
other infection with the HIV virus.62 Surprisingly, there have been no cases in Virginia 
at the appellate level to assist in the interpretation of the Disabilities Law. One author, 
faced with this problem, has suggested merely relying on the plain language of the 
statute.63 
61 See supra note 48. See also Local 1812, American Fed'n. of Gov't. 
Employees v. Dept. of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987), where AIDS testing 
was upheld on the grounds that persons who were HIV infected were medically unfit 
for worldwide service with the Department of State. The reasoning behind the 
testing was that many foreign posts are considered medically inadequate to deal with 
complications that may arise from the HIV infection, and both the sanitary conditions 
in other countries, and the live-virus vaccines which were often required for overseas 
assignments could exacerbate the condition of those already infected with the AIDS 
virus. [d. at 52. 
62 The Virginia Human Rights Act provides the policy behind the Act: 
[t]o safeguard all individuals within the 
Commonwealth from unlawful discrimination 
because of race, color, religion, ... , 
or disa~ility, ... in employment ... . 
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715.1 (1987). States with statutes whose codes specifically 
address persons with AIDS include Florida, Iowa, Maryland, and Texas. The Texas 
code expressly excludes persons with AIDS from its protection, if the "infection with 
human immunodeficiency virus . . . constitutes a direct threat to the health or safety 
of other persons or . . . makes the affected person unable to perform the duties of 
the person's employment." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(4)(B) 
(Vernon 1989). 
63 Comment, AIDS and Employment Discrimination Under the Federal 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Virginia's Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20 
U. RICH L. REV. 425, 446 (1985). 
63 
However, the current state of the federal law, after cases such as Arline and Chalk, 
as well as amendments to the Disabilities Law shed more light on how the Virginia 
statute would be interpreted. In 1988, the definition of "otherwise qualified person with 
a disability" was amended, making the Disabilities Law conform more closely with the 
Rehabilitation Act.64 This is a significant change in the law, because prior to this 
amendment, the major difference in the protections afforded persons with AIDS under 
the Disabilities Law, and the corresponding sections of the Rehabilitation Act, turned 
on the fact that the Rehabilitation Act included an allowance for accommodations when 
considering the qualifications of a potential employee infected with the AIDS virus.6S 
Conversely, the Disabilities Law defined an "otherwise qualified person with a 
disability" as one who had to be "qualified without accommodation" to perform the job 
in question.66 Accommodation, however reasonable, could not be considered in 
addressing whether or not the person was otherwise qualified for employment. Once 
the employee was hired, the now amended § 51.01-41(c) provided for accommodations 
once the employee had been deemed qualified, and hired.67 Since most persons with 
AIDS could easily and appropriately fill most of the positions from which they would 
have been barred because of their need for accommodations, the author correctly 
asserted that the Disabilities Law should be modified to conform to the Rehabilitation 
Act. 
64 VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-3 (1988 & Supp. 1989). The 1988 Amendments 
deleted the term "without accommodations" following the word "qualified" in the 
definition. 
6S 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. 1989). 
66 Comment, AIDS and Employment Discrimination under the Federal 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Virginia's Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20 
U. RICH. L. REv. 425,446-48 (1985) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 51.01-3 (Supp. 1985). 
67 Id. at 447-48. 
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In 1988, the Disabilities Law was indeed modified, and now reasonable 
accommodation is required when considering the employment of a person with AIDS.68 
Since this modification, the Disabilities Law is actually broader than the Rehabilitation 
Act, since it applies not only to those agencies and programs supported by state funds, 
but to private employers as well.69 Further, the Disabilities Law goes a step beyond the 
affirmative policies in the Rehabilitation Act, since it also mandates the formulation of 
specific policies in several state agencies for procedures dealing with AIDS in the 
scope of the workings of the agency.1O This affirmative step, encourages the agencies 
themselves to review their own policies and procedures for working with persons with 
AIDS, forces them to address the issue, indicates that Virginia's view on AIDS is 
68 VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-3 (1988 & Supp. 1989). As amended, § 51.5-3 now 
defines "otherwise qualified person" as one who is qualified [without 
accommodations] to perform the duties of a particular job or position. (Brackets 
mark text deleted by the 1988 Amendment.) [d. 
69 VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41(A) (1988). § 51.5-41(A) expands the coverage of 
the statute to cover private employers: 
[d. 
A. No employer shall discriminate in 
employment or promotion practices against 
an otherwise qualified person with a 
disability solely because of such disability. 
10 For instance, VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-51.14:1 mandates that 
The Boards of Health, Mental Health, Mental 
Retardation, and Substance Abuse Services, 
Rehabilitative Services, Social Services and 
Medical Assistance Services shall review their 
regulations and policies related to service 
delivery in order to ascertain and eliminate 
any discrimination against individuals infected 
with the human immunodeficiency virus. 
(emphasis added) 
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-51.14:1 (Supp. 1989). Other statutes provide for school-
attendance guidelines, and model education programs on the human 
immunodeficiency virus. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-271.3, 23-9.2:3.2 (Supp. 1989). 
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realistic, and that any cases concerning AIDS discrimination brought under the current 
code would be resolved in a manner that would interpret the code's provisions broadly. 
CONCLUSION 
The projections available on the probable spread of AIDS are disturbing. The 
U.S. Public Health Service has predicted that, by the end of 1991, 270,000 cases will 
have developed in the United States, with more than 74,000 of those occurring in that 
year alone; 179,000 people in the United States will have died of AIDS by 1991, with 
54,000 of those deaths occurring that year; and new cases of AIDS spread through 
heterosexual contact will increase from the 1,100 reported in 1986 to almost 7,000 in 
1991.71 With these numbers, the inescapable fact is that sooner or later every manager 
or employee will be faced with a subordinate or co-worker with AIDS.71 Problems 
arise when these employers adopt an ostrich posture, and refuse to recognize this 
possibility.73 Commonly-cited factors include the attitude that since the company has 
yet to be confronted with the issue of AIDS in the workforce, it can afford to deal with 
the problem when it arises, or that the sensitive nature of the disease is such that cases 
can only be dealt with on an individual basis.74 The natural result of these attitudes is 
that when a case of AIDS does surface at a particular workplace, the result is fear and 
discrimination, as reported in the survey at the opening of this article.7s 
71 LANGONE, AIDS: THE FACfS 67-68 (1988). 
12 Singer, AIDS Concerns for Business: Includes related articles on principles 
for the workplace and information about AIDS, NATION'S Bus., June 1989, at 75, _. 
73 Singer, Helping People with AIDS Stay on Job, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1989, 
§ 1, at 28, col. 1. 
74 AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, AIDS: THE NEW WORKPLACE IssUES 50 
(1988). 
7S Singer, supra note 72, at _. 
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While many states, as well as the federal government, are constantly expanding 
the employment protections afforded by their statutes and regulations that deal with 
handicapped individuals, the real key to ending this discrimination is education of the 
workforce.76 Like Virginia, many states are implementing this concept through their 
laws, which, while they may only affect a portion of the job market for now, lead the 
way and provide an example for companies in both the public and the private sector, 
in ending the irrational fear of individuals with AIDS. 
76 
Id. at_. 
Without more widespread education about AIDS, 
it appears that those with the disease will 
continue to experience discrimination through 
adverse decisions about hiring, ftring, promotion, 
and conditions of employment Programs that 
address the scientiftc, psychological, social, 
legal, and human-resource issues concerning AIDS 
can minimize workplace disruptions, preserve 
employee morale, and sidetrack discriminatory 
behavior. 
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THE ZONING OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AFTER 
LYNG V. NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION 
Michael Grattan 
INTRODUCflON 
The detennination of what constitutes a "religious use" for the purposes of state 
or local zoning ordinances is a difficult question! The issue presents a tension between 
the government's admittedly strong interest in regulating local areas and the right of 
individual entities to the free exercise of their religious beliefs.2 These often conflicting 
interests have not escaped the notice of the courts. Indeed, state courts have adopted 
widely divergent solutions to deal with the problem. Still, at no point has the United 
States Supreme Court decided a case that would unify, or at least give some guidance 
to, the state courts attempting to define "religious use." 
Though the Supreme Court has frequently heard zoning cases dealing with 
various first amendment issues,3 it has consistently refused to grant certiorari to zoning 
cases that implicate the free exercise clause of the first amendment.' Indeed, no federal 
1 Walker, What Constitutes a Religious Use for Zoning Purposes, 27 CATIJ. 
LAW. 129, 129-130 (1982). 
2 [d. at 130-31. 
3 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Schad v. Borough of 
Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 
50 (1976). 
4 See Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (lIth Cir. 1983), cat. 
denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, 
Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983), cerl. denied, 464 U.S. 815 
(1983); Marsland V. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 657 P.2d 
1035 (1983), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 805 (1983); Lubavitch Chabad House of 
Illinois, Inc. V. City of Evanston, 112 lll. App. 3d 223, 445 N.E.2d 343 (1982), cat. 
denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); Medford Assembly of God V. City of Medford, 72 
Or. App. 333, 695 P.2d 1379 (1983), cerl. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985). 
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appellate court addressed the free exercise clause in the zoning context until 1983.5 
This lack of guidance from the federal judiciary has given rise to a plethora of disparate 
state court approaches to free exercise zoning cases. The time is ripe for a unified 
approach.6 
The time may have come. Though the Supreme Court has still not decided a 
case which specifically addresses what is considered a religious use in the zoning 
context, it has recently addressed a related question. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Association,? the Court set forth criteria to determine the types of 
government regulation allowed under the free exercise clause of the first amendment.8 
Unlike many of the prior state court approaches, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lyng 
did not focus on whether the use involved was religious or not. Instead, the Lyng 
Court focused on the impact of the government regulation upon the practice and beliefs 
of the particular religious group involved.9 
In this article, I will attempt to show that the Supreme Court's new formulation 
of what is protected under the free exercise clause has unified a once diverse and 
eclectic body of case law. Though the Court in Lyng did not directly deal with a 
religious zoning question, it opened the door for local zoning boards across the country 
to zone religious institutions virtually the same way they would zone any other property. 
The zoning boards no longer have to examine the use in question. Indeed, whether the 
use itself is religious is now irrelevant. Based on Lyng, government zoning is valid as 
5 See Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 304. 
6 Cf, Note, In Search of Objective Criteria For a National Standard of Review 
in Church Zoning: Islamic Center of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville, 11 GEO. 
MASON L. REv. 147, 148 (1989). 
7 485 U.S. 439, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988). 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id. 
9 485 U.S. at _. 108 S. Ct. at 1326. 
69 
long as it does not directly or indirectly prohibit the practice or belief of a particular 
religion. lo 
The article will flrst briefly examine the power of governments to zone based 
upon Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. ll Second, it will review the facts and style 
of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.12 Third, the article will 
examine Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority in Lyng. This third section will 
include the three part "test"13 of what types of government action are prohibited under 
the free exercise clause. 14 Fourth, the article will examine the impact of Lyng upon 
various states' treatment of religious use property in the zoning context. The flnal 
section will examine Lyng's impact upon Virginia law. 
TRADITIONAL POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO ZONE 
In 1926, the Supreme Court decided Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.,I' 
a case that was destined to become the foundation of modem zoning law.16 The Euclid 
court observed the need for comprehensive zoning plans and for ac::ompanying 
restrictions upon the use of private property.17 These plans were a result of 
modernization and were necessary for the smooth functioning of society. IS Under the 
101d. 
II 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
12 485 U.S. 439, 108 S. Ct 1319 (1988). 
13 Justice O'Connor does not propose a "test" per se. She merely sets out the 
relevant criteria, 485 U.S. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1326. 
14 As will be noted below, the term "religious use" is now obsolete and should 
be discarded. 
I' 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
16 Walker, supra note 1, at 146. 
17 Id. (discussing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87). 
IS Id. at 146-47 (discussing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87). 
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court's analysis, zoning regulations were given a presumption of constitutional validity.19 
Only when the zoning ordinance was arbitrary, unreasonable and without any substantial 
relationship to public health, welfare, safety or morals would the ordinance be deemed 
unconstitutional.2D 
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld this presumption of validity. It has 
applied the presumption in cases involving government appropriation of private land for 
the purpose of devising a coordinated zoning plan;21 in cases involving government 
restriction on the composition of families that could live in single family dwellings;22 
and in cases involving government regulation of adult uses.23 When a zoning decision 
has infringed upon a fundamental right, the Court has been quick to strike down the 
proposed zoning ordinance.:1A The free exercise of religion is clearly a fundamental 
right.2!! 
Limitations on the free exercise of religion have traditionally been allowed, under 
the government's police power. The Supreme Court has held that the freedom to 
believe is absolute, but that the freedom to act in the furtherance of those beliefs is 
not.26 Religious conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.27 
19 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-89. 
2D Id. at 395. 
21 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
22 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
23 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (The Court based 
Renton on both first amendment and zoning analyses). 
:1A See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (regulation found to 
infringe on personal choice in matters of family and family life). 
2!! See Walker, supra note 1, at 154. 
26 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); see also, McDaniel v. 
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
27 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304. 
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For example, one's religious beliefs may not justify the committing of an overt criminal 
act.2lI On the other hand, the Court has also held that some aspects of religious exercise 
cannot in any way be restricted or burdened by federal or state legislation.29 The test 
traditionally applied in determining the validity of zoning ordinances is whether the state 
has a compelling interest in the legislation and whether less restrictive means exist to 
accomplish the state objective.30 
In Lyng, Justice O'Connor set out new31 criteria to be considered when 
determining whether government action has violated the free exercise clause. Those 
criteria severely limit the situations where government action implicates free exercise 
rights. After Lyng, the free exercise clause will apply only when the plaintiffs are in 
some way prohibited from practicing their religion. 
The impact of narrowly defining what is protected by the free exercise clause 
is significant. Clearly, strict scrutiny review is appropriate when first amendment rights 
are at issue.32 By narrowly defining what is protected by the free exercise clause, 
Justice O'Connor was able to avoid strict scrutiny review in Lyng. In the Court's view, 
no first amendment concerns were implicated.33 Therefore, the government did not need 
to show a compelling need for its action.34 A mere legitimate state interest test was 
good enough. Justice O'Connor did not change the level of review for occasions when 
221 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-64 (1878). 
29 Branfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961). 
30 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963). 
31 This may not actually be a "new" approach. Before Sherbert the Supreme 
Court used analysis similar to that used in Lyng when deciding free exercise issues. 
See Note, Wisconsin v. Yoder: The Right to Be Different-First Amendment Exemption 
for Amish under the Free Exercise Clause, 22 DE PAUL L. REv. 539, 545-46 (1972). 
32 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
33 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. at _, 108 S. 
Ct. at 1326. 
34 Id. 
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first amendment free exercise rights are implicated; instead she drastically reduced the 
number of occasions when an infringement rises to that level. 
FACfS AND STYLE OF 
LYNG V. NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION 
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,~ the United States 
Forest Service planned to complete a seventy-five mile road between two California 
towns by building a six mile connecting segment (the G-O road) through a national 
forest.36 The area had historically been used by members of three Indian tribes to 
conduct religious rituals for the purpose of personal spiritual development. 
A study commissioned by the Forest Service found that specific sites within the 
area were used for religious rituals, and that the area as a whole had great religious 
significance for the Indians. According to the study, successful religious use of the area 
depended on privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting. The study found that 
construction along any of the available routes would cause serious and irreparable 
damage to the sanctity of the area. 
Despite these findings, the Forest Service decided to proceed with the 
construction. The Forest Service chose a route through the area that avoided 
archeological sites as well as the sites used by contemporary Indians for specific 
spiritual activities. The Forest Service also adopted a plan allowing for the harvesting 
of timber in the area, with a half mile protective zone around the specific religious 
sites. 
An Indian organization, individual Indians, and others challenged both the timber-
harvesting and the road-building decisions in the United States District Court for the 
~ 485 U.S. 439, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988). 
36 The following factual description can be found at 485 U.S. at _, 108 S. Ct. 
at 1321-22. 
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Northern District of California.37 The district court found that both the timber-harvesting 
and road-building decisions violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment and 
several federal statutes.38 With regard to the first amendment claim, the district court 
permanently enjoined the timber-harvesting and the road-building.39 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the decision concluding that the Government failed to demonstrate a compelling 
interest in the completion of the G-O road.40 
ANALYSIS OF 
LYNG v. NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION 
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,41 the Supreme 
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision and determined that the United States ,Forest 
Service could build a six mile stretch of highway through government land considered 
sacred by local Indians.42 The Court reached this decision despite the appellate court's 
prediction that the construction and use of the road would "virtually destroy the Indians' 
ability to practice their religion. "43 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor based 
the Court's decision on two separate grounds. 
First, the Court stated that the government had a "right to use what is, after all, 
its land"44 (emphasis in original). The Court viewed the building of the highway as 
37 Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 
589-90 (N.D. Cal. 1983). 
38 Id. at 594-96. 
39 Id. 
40 Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 695 (9th 
Cir. 1986). 
41 485 U.S. 439, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988). 
42 [d. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1321. 
43 [d. at 1326 (quoting Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 795 F.2d 
688, 693 (9th Cir. 1986). 
44 [d. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1327. 
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involving "legitimate conduct by government of its own affairs."45 The Court also cited 
Bowen v. Ro;r for the proposition that the free exercise clause "does not afford an 
individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's [own] internal 
procedures. "47 Because the government action at issue in Lyng affected government 
land, rather than private land, this portion of the Court's decision is inapplicable to 
cases involving the zoning of private property. 
Second, and more important for zoning concerns, the Court also stated that the 
sacred Indian lands were not entitled to first amendment protection under the free 
exercise clause because the government action of building the road did not prohibit the 
practice of the Indian religion.48 
In Lyng, Justice O'Connor started from the perspective that the government 
action was "lawful"49 and "legitimate."so She then set forth three criteria to be 
considered when determining whether government action is prohibited under the free 
exercise clause. When phrased in the form of questions, these criteria form a three-
part test for what government action is permissible under the free exercise clause: 
1) Whether the government action actually prohibits the practice of religion;sl 
2) whether the government action has a tendency to coerce individuals to act 
contrary to their religious beliefs;S2 
3) whether the government action imposes penalties on the practice of that 
45 Id. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1326. 
46 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
47 Lyng, 485 U.S. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1325. 
48 Id. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1329. 
49 Id. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1326. 
so Id. 
slId. 
S2 Id. 
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religion.53 
If the answer to all three of these questions is negative, then no infringement of the free 
exercise of religion has occurred. All other "incidental effects of government 
programs," including those "that may make it more difficult to practice certain religions 
but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious 
beliefs" do not give rise to constitutional concerns.54 
Justice O'Connor based these criteria upon the literal text of the free exercise 
clause that states that "Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion]." (emphasis.in original).S!i Only government action that somehow prohibits the 
practice of religion is unconstitutional. Mere interference with religious practices will 
not do.56 
This three part test does not focus upon the land use in question. It also does 
not focus upon the government action per se. Instead, it examines the effect of the 
government regulation of the land use on the practice of religion. The phrase "religious 
use," previously the cornerstone of "church wning" jurisprudence, is now obsolete. As 
Justice O'Connor stated: "[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the 
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact 
from the government. "S7 Her point is that whether the land use is religious or not is 
irrelevant. Indeed, the Lyng Court admitted that the use at issue was religious. 58 The 
53 Id. This would come into play in a situation similar to that in Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), where ineligibility for unemployment benefits, based 
solely on a refusal to violate the Sabbath, was considered a fine on religious belief. 
54 Lyng, 485 U.S. 439, 108 S. Ct. 1326 (1988). 
55 See id. at 1329 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
56 Id. 
S7 Id. at _, 108 S. Ct. 1326 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., 
concurring». 
58 Id. 
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pertinent question after Lyng is whether the government action prohibits the practice and 
belief of a particular religion. 
By narrowly defining which governmental actions the free exercise clause 
disallows, Lyng invalidated, or at least undermined, a substantial amount of state case 
law defining "religious uses." Traditionally, state courts, to varying degrees, have 
protected religious uses of property from the states' otherwise plenary zoning power. 
Under Lyng, this must change. Lyng only barred actions which prohibit, as opposed to 
actions which inhibit the practice of a particular religion.59 
The Court made the practical argument that the "government simply could not 
operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires."60 The 
Court went on to point out that virtually every government action will affect the 
spiritual well-being of some person.61 The first amendment cannot give an individual 
citizen "a veto over public programs that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion."62 
It should be noted that Justice O'Connor tempered her position. She stated that 
nothing in the majority's opinion "should be read to encourage governmental 
insensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen."63 As evidence of the government's 
sensitivity, she pointed to the accommodations made by the Forest Service to ensure that 
the Indians' religious practices were disturbed as little as possible by the building of the 
road.64 This limitation on government conduct, i.e., sensitivity to religious needs, is, as 
the dissent noted, a "toothless exhortation. "6S It is really no limitation at all. 
59 [d. 
60 [d. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1327. 
61 [d. 
62 [d. 
63 [d. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1327-28. 
64 [d. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1328. 
6S [d. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1338 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the free exercise clause has 
a much broader scope than the majority allowed.66 In Brennan's view, government 
actions that merely inhibit, in addition to those that prohibit, religious use are invalid 
under the first amendment.67 Brennan stated that the free exercise clause is directed 
against any form of governmental action that inhibits or frustrates religious practice.68 
He rejected the majority's contention that the fIrst amendment bars only outright 
prohibitions, indirect coercion, and fInancial penalties on the free exercise of religion.6!I 
Brennan viewed the majority's decision to allow the Forest Service to build the 
G-O road through sacred Indian lands as impermissible interference with the practice 
of the Indians' religion.70 First, the majority's decision refused "to even acknowledge 
the constitutional injury the [Indians would] suffer."7. Second, the majority's "refusal" 
to affIrm the injunction "essentially [left] Native Americans with absolutely no 
constitutional protection against perhaps the gravest threat to their religious practices.'072 
Brennan cryptically concluded that this decision left the Indians with a hollow freedom, 
which "fail[ed] utterly to accord with the dictates of the First Amendment.'t73 
66 [d. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1330 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
67 [d. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1335 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
68 [d. 
6!1 [d. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
70 [d. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1330 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
7. [d. 
73 [d. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1340 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's 
characterization of the majority decision as bad fIrst amendment law will not be 
addressed here. This paper makes no attempt to critique the majority's reasoning in 
Lyng. This paper attempts to examine the impact of the Lyng decision, not question 
its wisdom. 
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Lyng is distinguishable from zoning cases because it involves use of federal and 
not private lands.74 Therefore, the case does not compel state courts to change their 
free exercise standards in the zoning area. Still, Lyng is a guiding light in the 
traditionally dark and murky free exercise area.75 State courts must now adopt a new 
approach to determine how churches and other religious institutions may be zoned. 
In every state, the new approach will give great power to zoning boards. Because 
states have widely different approaches to the free exercise question, each will have 
its own unique adaptations to the new standard. 
VARIOUS STATE TESTS AND 
LYNG'S EFFECf ON TIlOSE TESTS 
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof. "76 The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the clause in the 
specific context of zoning regulations.77 As a result of this lack of guidance, states 
have developed individual approaches to determine what is considered a religious use. 
Approximately five schools of thought can be discerned from the diverse case law.78 
These approaches are best exemplified by the approaches of: 1) California; 2) Texas 
74 Id. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1327. 
75 The Supreme Court has stated that the language of the Religion Clauses of 
the first amendment "is at best opaque." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 
(1971). 
76 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
77 See supra note 4. 
78 At least one commentator has stated that only two groups could be discerned, 
i.e., the California and the New York approaches. In his view all of the other 
approaches fell into one of these two camps. See Pearlman, Zoning and the 
Location of Religious Establishments, 31 CATII. LAW. 314, 317 (1986). 
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and Pennsylvania; 3) the federal courts; 4) Michigan, New Jersey and Oregon; 5) New 
York.79 
The California Approach 
California courts employ the most restrictive approach regarding whether 
churches may be excluded from certain areas.80 California gives great weight to 
legislative judgment regarding zoning issues and is loathe to second-guess those 
judgments. The basic standard in California was stated in Corporation of Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville.81 There, 
a California court held a church could be prohibited from single family districts as long 
as a legislative body of a community made a valid judgment that the churches in those 
district would cause traffic, noise and parking problems.82 Like the majority in Lyng, 
the Porterville court started from the view that the zoning regulation was legitimate.83 
The Porterville court allowed the religious nature of the use in question to be taken into 
account as one of several factors to be considered when making a zoning decision.84 
The weight given this religious factor was not detennined by the court, but by the 
community group making the zoning decision.85 The court analogized the regulation of 
religious institutions through zoning ordinances to the regulation of religious institutions 
79 Goldberg, Gimme Shelter: Religious Provision of Shelter to the Homeless as a 
Protected Use Under Zoning Laws, 30 WASH. V.J. VRB. & CONTEMP. L. 75 (1986). 
80 [d. at 90-91 n. 94. 
81 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949), appeal dismissed, 338 V.S. 805 
(1949). 
82 [d. at _, 203 P.2d at 825. 
83 [d. at _, 203 P.2d at 825-26. 
84 [d. at _, 203 P.2d at 825. 
85 [d. 
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through building codes.86 According to the court, the plaintiff had the burden of 
proving that the regulation was unreasonable.81 The plaintiff failed to make such a 
showing.88 
Since Porterville, the California courts have continued to hold that communities 
have the right to exclude churches from residential areas.89 Those courts have generally 
treated religious uses the same as other uses for zoning purposes.\lO Under the California 
standard, the community must merely show a rational basis for zoning the church as it 
did.91 One court has even explicitly rejected the majority position disallowing restriction 
of churches as an extreme viewpoint which ignores the basis of modern day zoning.92 
Although the California courts have not entirely ignored the free exercise limitations 
involved in zoning religious institutions,93 they have held that the consideration of those 
limitations should be at the planning stage rather than at the judicial stage.94 
The restrictive nature of the California approach and its deference to legislative 
judgment will continue to have vitality after Lyng; however, the method in which 
California weighs the religious nature of a use will have to change. The California 
.86 [d. 
81 [d. at _, 203 P.2d at 826. 
88 [d. 
89 See Garden Grove Congregation of Jehovah's Witness v. City of Garden 
Grove, 176 Cal. App. 2d 136, 1 Cal Rptr. 65 (1959); Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 
Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958); City of Chico v. First Ave. Baptist Church, 
108 Cal. App. 2d 297, 238 P.2d 587 (1951). 
\lO See Minney, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958); see also, Garden 
Grove, 176 Cal. App. 2d 136, 1 Cal Rptr. 65 (1959). 
91 Minney, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958). The use of a rational 
basis standard can be implied from the court's decision. 
92 [d. 
93 Garden Grove, 176 Cal. App. 2d 136, 1 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1959). 
94 [d. 
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approach does not examine the effect of the religious behavior upon the belief of the 
petitioners. Under the criteria set forth in Lyng, the petitioner's religious belief is the 
center of the analysis. 
Applying the new criteria to the fact situation in Porterville, for instance, the 
court would examine whether the denial of the permit prohibited the practice of the 
religion, coerced the believers into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or financially 
penalized them for their beliefs. Because the zoning restriction in Porterville allowed 
churches in other parts of the city,!IS the practice of the petitioners was neither prohibited 
nor substantively frustrated. The case also offers no evidence that it would cost the 
religious practitioners any more money to build their church in a non-residential area. 
Under the Lyng test, therefore, the court would find no infringement of the right of free 
exercise of religion.96 
The Texas/Pennsylvania Approach97 
The Pennsylvania courts look at the purpose of the land's use to determine 
whether the conduct in question constitutes a "religious use" of the property.911 Under 
this approach, if the purpose is found to be secular, the zoning ordinance will be 
upheld.99 Thus, a cemetery was found to be secular even though the land on which the 
!IS Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d at _, 203 P.2d at 824. 
96 Factually, this case is remarkably similar to Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of 
Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983). Lakewood is discussed extensively below. 
97 One commentator has stated that Texas and Pennsylvania represent separate 
approaches. See Goldberg, supra note 79, at 91. I believe, however, that Texas and 
Pennsylvania follow the same theoretical approach although the Texas approach is 
more restrictive in application. 
911 Goldberg, supra note 79. 
99 Id. (citing In re Russian Orthodox Church, 397 Pa. 126, 152 A.2d 489 
(1959)). It makes no difference what type of entity is conducting the use. Mere 
ownership by a religious entity does not indicate a religious use. Russian Orthodox 
at 129, 152 A.2d at 491. 
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cemetery rested was owned by a church. IOO Similarly, a religious, for-profit radio station 
was held not to be a religious use. IOI Religious use has been broadly defined in 
Pennsylvania. A Pennsylvania court has defined "church" as protecting "any purpose 
connected with the religious practices which the group or sect maintaining that particular 
church desires to pursue. "102 For example, Pennsylvania courts have found retreat 
houses,l03 houses used to lodge travelling missionaries, and houses to conduct religious 
classes and to do office work are within the definition of churches. 104 
The perspective of the Pennsylvania courts must change. Courts must not focus 
on the proposed use by the religious entity. Courts should focus on the effect of the 
government action on the religious belief. Note that under Lyng's criteria the issue is 
not the effect of the government decision on the use itself, but on the religious belief 
of the petitioners. 
For example, in the Pennsylvania cemetery case/os the court would not examine 
whether the use of the cemetery was religious, nor would the court ask whether the 
government action affected the use of the cemetery. After Lyng, the court should focus 
upon whether the government's restriction of the use of the property affected the belief 
of the petitioners. The Lyng approach focuses on the beliefs of the religious petitioners, 
not upon the effect of the government regulation on the use. The government's zoning 
of the cemetery did not prohibit the practice of the religion. The case offers no 
100 Russian Orthodox at 129, 152 A.2d at 491. 
101 Goldberg, supra note 79, at 91-92 (citing Gallagher v. Zoning Board of 
Adjustment, 32 Pa. D & C.2d 669 (Dist. & County Ct. 1963». 
102 Goldberg, supra note 79, at 92 (citing In re Stark, 72 Pa. D & C. 168, 189 
(1950». 
103 Id. 
104 Goldberg, supra note 79, at 92 (citing Conversion Center v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment, 2 Pa. Commw. 306, _, 278 A.2d 369, 370 (1971». 
lOS Russian Orthodox, 397 Pa. 126, 152 A.2d 489 (1959). 
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evidence that the zoning restriction financially penalized the practice of the religion or 
:) 
that it had a tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs. 
Therefore, after Lyng, the zoning in the cemetery case would be valid. 
Although the Texas approach is theoretically similar to the Pennsylvania 
approach, the Texas view is more restrictive in its application. Like Pennsylvania, 
Texas courts look to the use in question to determine whether it is religious or secular. 
If the use is secular, it is not protected from zoning regulation. Unlike Pennsylvania, 
however, the Texas courts construe the meaning of religious use narrowly.l06 Although 
both states examine the. use in question, the use will have to be closer to the core of 
the religious beliefs in Texas than it would be in Pennsylvania to receive protection.I07 
Coe v. City of DallaslO8 gives a good example of the restrictive nature of the 
Texas approach. In Coe, the appellants, believers in faith healing, sought to compel the 
City of Dallas to issue a building permit for the purposes of building a church.109 The 
court upheld the city council's determination that the proposed site was not a church 
even though the building was going to have 600 square feet of church proper attached 
to 2400 square feet of healing or prayer space.110 One commentator has noted that the 
city council's decision that the building was not a church was probably erroneous. lll 
After Lyng, the restrictive nature of this approach will remain substantially 
unchanged. Texas courts will continue to rarely invoke first amendment analysis in 
church zoning cases. Justice O'Connor's opinion indicates that the United States 
106 Goldberg, supra note 79, at 91 (discussing Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 
S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970». 
107 Cf, Goldberg, supra note 79, at 90-92. 
lOS 266 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). 
109 [d. at 182-83. 
llO [d. at 183. 
III Walker, supra note I, at 163 (1982). 
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Supreme Coun, like the couns of Texas, is willing to trust the legislature's decision on 
the appropriate location for churches. In practice, there should be no change in the 
result of church zoning cases in Texas. 
The rationale of the Texas approach will change somewhat, however, because 
these couns must now shift their examination of "religious uses" away from the use 
itself and focus on the effect of the government's regulation of that use upon the 
practice of the religion involved. Thus, in Coe, the question is not whether the 
religious healing that would occur in the healing space is a religious use, but whether 
the denial of the building permit prohibits the practice of the religion, penalizes the 
practitioners of the religion for their beliefs, or somehow coerces those practitioners into 
acting contrary to their beliefs. 
Under the new criteria, the coun would most likely find that the church in Coe 
would not pass the three pan test The denial of the building permit, absent evidence 
that the church was unable to build elsewhere in the city, does not prohibit the practice 
of the religion. Additionally, no evidence exists showing that the zoning restriction 
either coerced the petitioners into not believing in faith healing or imposed any financial 
penalty for holding that belief. Therefore, the denial of the building permit would not 
implicate first amendment concerns. 
The Federal Approach 
Three federal courts have specifically addressed the circumstances under which 
religious institutions may be zoned. Each court differs slightly on the test to be applied 
in determining what is a religious use. The most thorough treatment of the topic was 
given by the Eleventh Circuit in Grosz v. City of Miami Beach.1I2 The Grosz court put 
the test in terms of two threshold questions: 
112 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984). 
85 
1) whether the government action regulated religious belief or religious 
conduct?113 If the government is attempting to regulate the plaintiff's beliefs, the 
regulation was invalid. If, however, the regulation was merely attempting to regulate 
religious conduct, then the flrst threshold would be passed. If the government action 
validly regulated conduct, the court would move to the second consideration;114 
2) whether the regulation had a secular purpose as well as a secular effect?115 
A sectarian purpose was prohibited, whereas a secular purpose was allowed. 116 
With its focus on the government action, the initial inquiry in Grosz is, to some 
extent, still correct after Lyng. The flrst part of the Grosz test is inaccurate because it 
examines the government's purpose for the zoning restriction instead of the actual effect 
of that restriction. Part one of the Grosz test examines whether the government action 
somehow infringes upon the practice of religious beliefs. The purposes of the regulation 
are irrelevant. The effect of the regulation on the practice of the religion is what is 
important. 
For the same reason the second part of the Grosz test is incorrect after Lyng to 
the extent that it looks exclusively to the purposes of the government action and not to 
the effect of the government action upon the beliefs of the petitioners. 111 The purposes 
of the regulation are irrelevant after Lyng. There, the majority did not fmd that the 
government's purposes in constructing the G-O road were vital. That was not the 
113 [d. at 733. 
114 [d. 
115 [d. 
116 [d. 
111 The Grosz court gave some consideration to the effect of a government 
regulation, noting that a law would violate the free exercise clause if the "essential 
effect of the government action [was] to influence negatively the pursuit of religious 
activity or the expression of religious belief." [d. at 733. 
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crucial issue. The crucial issue was whether the government's use prohibited the 
practice of religion.118 
The second federal case to address the zoning of religious institutions was 
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood.119 
Lakewood involved a church which wanted to relocate in a residential neighborhood 
consisting of large one and two-family homes. l20 The church was initially denied an 
exception to the local residential zoning for several reasons, including noise and traffic 
hazards. 12I After a comprehensive rezoning of the city, the zoning ordinance left the 
property in a single-family district that did not pennit churches. The church was again 
denied a permit. lll 
The Lakewood court examined the nature of the religious observance and the 
burden placed on that observance by the zoning regulation. 123 The court concluded that 
though financial and aesthetic burdens existed, they were only indirect burdens. 
Therefore, first amendment rights were not implicated. l24 The court held that relocating 
to a more attractive part of the city, though desireable, was not an indispensable tenet 
of the religious belief. l 2.5 The fact that only 10% of the land in the city was suitable 
for a new church was not a factor in the decision. If the church wished to locate in 
118 485 U.S. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 1326. 
119 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983). 
120 Id. at 304. 
121 Id. at 304-05. 
III Id. at 305. 
123 Id. at 306-07. 
124 Id. at 307-08. 
12.5 Id. at 307. 
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a residential neighborhood, it could buy existing churches or buildings in 90% of the 
city or use the 10% of the city that was zoned for religious uses!26 
The Lakewood analysis should continue to have vitality after Lyng and should 
still be an appropriate standard for detennining whether a zoning regulation infringes 
upon the free exercise clause. Applying the three criteria of Lyng to the situation in 
Lakewood, one gets the same result with virtually the same reasoning. The denial of 
the building pennit did not prohibit the exercise of religion. The religious group could 
still practice their religion either where they had been doing so previously or in the 
10% of the city left open for churches. No one was compelled to act contrary to their 
religious beliefs. The petitioners could still practice in the same manner and in the 
same location as they had before. Finally, the financial penalty imposed by the city, 
i.e., not allowing the church to build on residential property, did not directly penalize 
the petitioners for their beliefs.127 No fine was imposed for the belief of the religion. 
The most recent federal case to address the church zoning issue is Islamic 
Center of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville. l28 Islamic Center involved a group of 
Muslim college students who were denied a permit to establish a religious institution 
as a place of worship and housing. The Fifth Circuit determined that the students' 
proposed establishment of a place of worship was a religious use and strictly scrutinized 
the state action.129 The court held that the denial of the pennit impennissibly burdened 
126 Id. at 307. Note that the Supreme Court has previously employed similar 
reasoning in the case of adult uses. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
127 Arguably, any added costs the church accrued in finding and purchasing 
alternate land could be construed as similar to the costs the court found offensive in 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). I have not taken that view here, however, 
because the penalty involved in Sherbert, i.e., no unemployment benefits unless 
applicant worked on the Sabbath, was a direct penalty to the free exercise of 
religion. ld. Here, any added cost would be an indirect cost to the petitioner. 
128 840 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988). 
129 ld. at 300. 
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the students' free exercise rights and suggested that it amounted to a denial of equal 
protection under the law. 130 
In light of Lyng, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Islamic Center is troublesome. 
The decision could go either way. It could be argued that the denial of the permit 
did not prohibit the students from practicing their religion. They did not have a place 
of worship before they applied for the permit but they had still worshipped; no coercion 
of any type was involved here, and there was no financial penalty for practicing their 
beliefs. On the other hand, the structure involved here was a "church," i.e., a place of 
worship. If the free exercise clause does not prohibit the government from denying a 
permit to an organization attempting to establish (as opposed to merely relocating as in 
Lakewood) a religious institution, then it would seem that Lyng has essentially read the 
free exercise clause out of zoning issues. 
The Michigan/New Jersey/Oregon Approach 
This view focuses not upon the use as in the Pennsylvania approach, but upon 
the structure involved. These courts ask whether the building or property affected by 
the government regulation is a "church."131 Thus, in Portage Township v. Full Salvation 
Union,l3l camp meetings requiring the use of tents and shacks were found to violate the 
local zoning ordinance and were not considered a religious use.133 The court reasoned 
that, even though religious services were conducted in the tents, not every place where 
religious services were held is a "church."I34 
130 Id. 
131 Goldberg, supra note 79, at 92. 
132 318 Mich. 693, 29 N.W.2d 297 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 851 
(1948), reh'g denied, 334 U.S. 830 (1948). 
1331d. at 699-700, 29 N.W.2d at 800. 
134 Id. at 700, 29 N.W.2d at 300. 
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Similarly, in Sexton v. Bates,135 the Superior Court of New Jersey found that a 
Jewish mikvahl36 was not a "church" or "accessory use" and disallowed a building 
permit authorizing alterations for its construction in a one family house. 137 The court, 
though accepting the religious importance of the mikvah, narrowly construed the term 
"church "138 to be "a place where persons regularly assembled for worship. "139 One 
commentator has correctly noted that by this narrow "semantic inquiry," the New Jersey 
Court "effectively precluded consideration of the free exercise questions presented by 
the restriction. "140 
After Lyng, this restriction, i.e., the refusal of the building permit to build a 
mikvah in a home zoned as residential, would not prohibit the practice of the religion, 
financially penalize the practice of the religion, or coerce Jewish believers into acting 
contrary to their religious beliefs. The mikvah could still take place in an authorized 
place of worship, at no extra cost to the believers. As long as the city authorized some 
place for the mikvah, no free exercise claims would succeed under Lyng. In short, after 
Lyng, as long as this zoning restriction is not arbitrary, it is valid. 
Using similar reasoning, an Oregon court upheld the local county commissioner's 
denial of a conditional use permit for a church, school and gymnasium in a residentially 
wned district.141 The court upheld the administrative board's decision because a rational 
135 17 N.J. Super. 246, 85 A.2d 833 (1951), affirmed, sub nom, Sexton v. Essex 
County Ritualarium, 21 N.J. Super. 329, 91 A.2d 162 (1952). 
136 A mikvah, used mostly by Jewish females, is a ritualistic bathing place for 
purification in accordance with Jewish law. [d. at 252-53, 85 A.2d at 835-36. 
137 [d. at 248, 85 A.2d at 838-39. 
138 The court assumed that something had to fit into the defmition of church to 
be considered an accessory use. [d. at 258, 85 A.2d at 839. 
139 [d. at 255, 85 A.2d at 837. 
140 Walker, supra note 1, at 159. 
141 Archdiocese of Portland v. County of Washington, 254 Or. 77, 458 P.2d 682 
(1969) (en banc). 
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basis existed for the board's decision.142 The court here, as the New Jersey court·in 
Sexton v. Bates, did not consider the structure involved as essential to the religious 
belief of the plaintiffs.143 It was not a "church" and therefore was not entitled to free 
exercise protection. 
Again, after Lyng, the Supreme Court would not consider these "religious uses" 
sufficient to trigger the free exercise clause. A school and gymnasium are not 
absolutely essential to the plaintiff's beliefs; denial of the permit imposes no financial 
penalty upon the believers; and the denial of the permit did not coerce the plaintiffs to 
act contrary to their religious beliefs. No first amendment rights are implicated. In 
sum, the Michigan/New Jersey/Oregon "is it a church?" approach should have no 
application after Lyng. There, the Court explicitly stated that the "Indian religious 
practices [were] intimately and inextricably bound up" with the land at issue in the 
case.l44 In Michigan/New Jersey terms, the land at issue in Lyng was a "church." This 
factor did not influence the Court's decision. The focus now is not on 'the structure 
but on the effect of a restriction on actual beliefs. 
The New York Approach 
New York has the most expansive definition of "religious use." The New York 
approach is the majority approach in the United States.145 In New York, a religious use 
is broadly defined as "a conduct with a religious purpose."I46 This requirement has been 
interpreted to include "any conduct which is in accordance with the doctrines, practices 
142 Id. at 87, 458 P.2d at 686-87. 
143Id. 
144 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, _, 108 
S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1988). 
145 See Pearlman, Zoning and the Location of Religious Institutions, 31 CATH. 
LAW. 314, 317 (1986). 
146 Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 66 Misc. 2d 312, 316, 319 
N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 (Sup. Ct. 1971). 
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or regulations of a religious organization."147 Any activity related to the purpose of a 
religious organization is a religious use. l48 This expansive protection of churches is 
based upon the theory that churches, synagogues and other religious institutions serve 
a high moral purpose and therefore should not be subject to local zoning as are other 
properties.149 
Lyng and any progeny should effectively destroy this approach. The judicial 
zoning exercised by the New York courts when reviewing religious use issues is 
contrary to the language and spirit of Lyng. The "Constitution does not, and courts 
cannot, offer to reconcile the various competing demands on government, many of them 
rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as ours. ISO 
That task, to the extent it is feasible, is for the legislatures and other institutions."151 
The New York approach is invalid after Lyng for two reasons. First, New York 
courts erroneously focus upon the use rather than the effect of the government action. 
Second, they are very expansive in their definition of religious use. Clearly, the 
intention of the court in Lyng was to limit, not increase, the protection the free exercise 
clause offered against the government's power to regulate religious property. 
For example, in Community Synagogue v. Bates;52 the New York Court of 
Appeals reversed a zoning board's determination denying a use permit under a village 
147 Goldberg, supra note 79, at 93 (citing Note, Judicial Definition of Religious 
Use in Zoning Cases, URB. L. ANN 291, 292 (1973)). 
148 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZoNING, § 12.25 at 460 (2d ed. 1976). 
149 Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 
N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956). 
ISO Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, _, 108 
S. Ct. 1319, 1327 (1988). 
151 [d. 
152 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956). 
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roning ordinance.U3 The court found the local board's factual conclusion that the 
property was to be utilized for other than a church or other strictly religious use to be 
incorrect. I304 The court concluded that to allow the zoning board to have the authority 
to deny an application for a church at any particular location would be to confer upon 
it the power to dictate the location of a place of worship, and to thereby interfere with 
the "free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship."155 
This type of judicial factual review of roning decisions is entirely against the 
basic notion of the Lyng decision. The Lyng approach would presume the validity of 
the zoning board's decision. Then, it would use the three part test. If no type of 
prohibition, penalty or coercion appeared, then the zoning regulation would be valid. 
With its expansive view, New York effectively defines roning ordinances that affect 
religious property as presumptively invalid. Clearly, this is contrary to the intent and 
language of Lyng. 
In Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board,l56 a companion case to Bates, the 
court held that an adverse effect on property values, loss of potential tax revenue, 
decreased enjoyment of neighboring property, possible traffic hazards and lack of 
opportunity for future residential development failed to justify the denial of a building 
permit for a church and school. 157 Here, as in Bates, the New York courts required a 
compellingl58 interest by the state to justify the imposition of burdens on a religious 
institution. The very means most often invoked to justify imposition of zoning under 
1531d. at 458, 136 N.E.2d at 496, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 26. 
1304 Id. at 453. 136 N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22. 
155 Id. at 458, 136 N.E.2d at 496, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 26 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. 
I, 
sec. 3). 
156 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sup. Ct. 1956). 
157 Id. at 524-26, 136 N.E.2d at 835-37, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861-63. 
158 The Diocese of Rochester court did not use the word "compelling." 
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the rational basis inquiry--diminished potential tax revenue and enjoyment of property-
-were explicitly found to be insufficient to deny the church the use of its property for 
religious purposes. 159 
In short, under the New York approach, any use of property that is connected 
in any way with the beliefs of a religious organization is protected from the zoning 
authority of the local government. After Lyng, this position is constitutionally unsound. 
LYNG'S EFFECT ON VIRGINIA LAW 
Unlike the states addressed above, Virginia courts have never directly addressed 
the role of the federal or statel60 free exercise clauses in the zoning context. The 
question in Virginia, therefore, is not how to change the law regarding the wning of 
religious institutions but how to merge existing zoning law with free exercise 
'jurisprudence after Lyng. In Virginia, a zoning board's decision to zone an area is 
considered a "legislative" action. 161 There is a rebuttable presumption that legislative 
actions are reasonable,l62 and the party challenging the zoning regulation has :he burden 
of rebutting that presumption. 163 "Legislative action is [considered] reasonable if the 
matter in issue is fairly debatable."I64 An issue is "fairly debatable" when the evidence 
offered. in support of the opposing views would lead objective and reasonable persons 
159 Walker, supra note 1, at 173. 
160 VA. CONST. art. I § 16. 
161 County Bd. of Arlington County v. Bratic, 237 Va. 221, 227, 377 S.E.2d 
368, 371 (1989). 
162 Id. at 371. 
163 Bratic, 237 Va. at 227, 377 S.E.2d at 371; Bd. of Supervisors in Loudoun 
County v. Lerner, 221 Va. 30, 34, 267 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1980). 
164 Bratic, 237 Va. at 227, 377 S.E.2d at 371; see also, Fairfax County v. 
Parker, 186 Va. 675, 680, 44 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1947). 
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to different conclusions. l65 When the issue of reasonableness is "fairly debatable," the 
legislative decision to zone will be sustained. l66 
Thus, when coupled with these existing standards, Lyng allows Virginia localities 
to zone churches freely, as long as the following conditions are met: 
1) The zoning decision is a reasonable one (whether the decision is correct 
is an issue over which objective and reasonable people could differ); 
2) The Board is "sensitive" to the religious nature of the property; 
3) The zoning action does not impose financial penalties on the practice of 
that religion; 
4) The zoning decision does not actually prohibit the practice of religion; and, 
5) The government action does not tend to coerce individuals to act contrary 
to their religious beliefs. 
Thus, Virginia lawmakers have a relatively free hand when zoning religious 
institutions. As long as they act reasonably and take religious beliefs into consideration 
when making zoning decisions, they should be able to zone religious facilities with 
minimal constraint. 
CONCLUSION 
The Lyng decision provides a unified approach to what has been a 
diverse and confused area of the law. Because no Supreme Court decision had ever 
addressed the free exercise clause in the land use context, state courts had differed 
widely on the protection afforded religious institutions in the zoning context. Although 
not directly applicable to the zoning context, Lyng is significant because it establishes 
165 Bratic, 237 Va. at 227, 377 S.E.2d at 371.; see also, Fairfax County v. 
Williams, 216 Va. 49, 58, 216 S.E.2d 33, 40 (1975). 
166 Bratic, 237 Va. at 227, 377 S.E.2d at 371. 
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some basic parameters under which state and lower federal courts can continue to guide 
free exercise jurisprudence in land use legislation. These parameters are: 
1) The protection afforded religious institutions by the free exercise clause is 
narrow, not broad as has been suggested by some commentators. 167 
2) Whether something is protected by the free exercise clause will be 
determined by looking at three criteria: 
a) whether the government action actually prohibits the practice of 
religion; 
b) whether the government action has a tendency to coerce individuals 
to act contrary to their religious beliefs; 
c) whether the government action imposes financial penalties on the 
practice of that religion. 
3) The government, at least to some extent, must continue to be sensitive to the 
needs of religious institutions. 
Lyng has given state courts some guidance in an area where none had previously 
existed. To conform with Lyng, every state that has addressed the issue of church 
zoning must now change to some degree. The broadest approaches, e.g., New York's, 
are now invalid. While it is true that religious uses have traditionally been viewed as 
favored uses,l68 how this favoritism will be factored in the free exercise clause is unclear 
after the Lyng decision. Specific details will have to be determined in subsequent cases. 
Some protection does survive; how much is uncertain. 
Even with this surviving protection, Lyng has severely limited any first 
amendment protection of religious institutions in the land use context. After Lyng, the 
167 Walker, supra note 1, at 173. See also, Note, In Search of Objective 
Criteria For a National Standard of Review in Church Zoning: Islamic Center of 
Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville, 11 GEO. MASON V.L. REv. 147 (1989). 
168 See Garden Grove Congregation of Jehovah's Witness v. City of Garden 
Grove, 176 Cal. App. 2d 136, 1 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1959). 
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standard in the religious zoning context should be similar to the Lakewood holding 
discussed above. First amendment protection will be construed narrowly. As long as 
local zoning boards are somewhat solicitous of the concerns of religious institutions, 
these boards can essentially wne religious institutions as they would any other 
properties. Lyng gives the state power at the expense of the church. 
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ATTORNEY ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION IN VIRGINIA 
Peter S. Jordan 
Steven N. Nachman 
Since the mid-1970s, when the modem commercial speech doctrine was born, 
attorneys throughout the United States have turned in increasing numbers to advertising 
and solicitation in order to attract clients. States have struggled with such efforts, 
striving on the one hand to protect the public from abusive advertising and solicitation 
practices while on the other to respect attorneys' first amendment rights. The Virginia 
rules governing advertising and solicitation, adopted in 1983 in the revised Code of 
Professional Responsibility, are considerably more permissive than the rules of most 
other states and those recommended by the ABA. This article surveys the major United 
States Supreme Court decisions on advertising and solicitation, the ABA Model rules, 
and the Virginia disciplinary rules. Following this article is an interview with the 
President of the Virginia State Bar Association, Phillip B. Morris, concerning efforts by 
the association to place greater restrictions on in-person solicitation of prospective 
clients. 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: FROM BATES TO SHAPERO 
For nearly a century since Alabama first addressed the issue of ethical 
standards for attorney behavior in 1887, the United States Supreme Court considered 
absolute prohibitions on attorney advertising and solicitation constitutional. l In 1976 the 
1 The Alabama State Bar Association adopted the first Code of Professional 
Ethics in 1887, permitting attorneys to provide useful information about legal 
services to the general public. The courts, however, did not look favorably on 
attorney self-promotion in any form. See Calvani, Langenfeld & Shuford, Attorney 
Advertising and Competition at the Bar, 41 V AND. L. REv. 761, 762-74 (1988) 
(containing a discussion of the history of ethical and judicial restraints on attorney 
advertising and solicitation). See also Bowers & Stephens, Attorney Advertising and 
the First Amendment: The Development and Impact of a Constitutional Standard, 17 
MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 221 (1987). 
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Court, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc.,2 fonnulated the modem commercial speech doctrine, affording commercial speech 
limited fIrst amendment protection.] The recognition of advertising as commercial 
speech forced the courts to reevaluate the constitutionality of prohibitions on attorney 
advertising and solicitation.4 
The following year, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,s the Court extended fIrst 
amendment protection to certain fonns of attorney advertising. In Bates, two attorneys 
listed their fees for routine legal services in local newspaper advertisements.6 The Court 
found that the public interest in receiving infonnation outweighed the state's interest in 
suppressing attorney advertising.7 The Court held that although a state could prohibit 
false, deceptive or misleading advertising, it could not impose an absolute ban on all 
attorney advertising.8 
The Court clarifIed this standard in In re R.MJ.9 by ruling that absent a fInding 
that the advertising in question was false or misleading, restrictions on attorney 
advertising "may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent ... deception. "10 
Accordingly the Court held a regulation prohibiting the mailing of professional 
2 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
] Id. at 770. See also Recent Developments, Shapero v. Kentucky Bar 
Association: Regulating Lawyers' Targeted Direct-Mail Advertising -- A 
Constitutional Standard For An Ethical Dilemma, 63 TUL. L. REV. 724, 726-27 n.13 
(1989). 
4 See Note, Professional Ethics -- Direct Mailings by Attorneys to Target 
Audiences, 16 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 409, 410 (1986). 
S 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
6 Id. at 354. 
7 Id. at 379. 
8 Id. at 383-84. 
9 455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
10 Id. at 203. See also Recent Developments, supra note 3, at 728. 
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announcement cards by attorneys to persons other than family, friends, other attorneys, 
clients and former clients overly restrictive and in violation of the first amendment. 11 
The Supreme Court also considered the extension of first amendment protection 
to different forms of client solicitation by attorneys in the companion cases of Ohralik 
v. Ohio State Bar Associationl2 and In re Primus.13 These two cases represented 
opposite ends of the solicitation spectrum. In Ohralik, an attorney personally solicited 
the business of two young automobile accident victims.14 The Court upheld the state's 
prophylactic rule against in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain, finding that the 
potential for undue pressure, overreaching and other forms of misconduct inherent in in-
person solicitation went beyond the constitutional protection enunciated in Bates.15 In 
Primus, however, the Court ruled that solicitation by direct-mail letter informing a 
potential client of free legal assistance available from the A.C.L.U. was worthy of 
constitutional protection.16 The Court distinguished this case from Ohralik by 
charac~erizing the solicitation as politically rather than financially motivated and 
determining that the potential adverse consequences of in-person solicitation were not 
shown to be present in this direct-mail solicitation.11 
The Supreme Court again confronted the issue of attorney advertising in 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,18 which 
involved a newspaper advertisement directed towards a specific class of potential clients. 
11 R.M.I., 455 U.S. at 206-07. 
12 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
13 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
14 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449-50. 
15 Id. at 465-68. 
16 Primus, 436 U.S. 439. 
11 Id. at 434-36. 
18 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
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The advertisement targeted women who had suffered injuries from the use of the 
Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device.19 The Court found the advertisement to be bUthful 
and that the public interest in the free flow of information outweighed the justifications 
for regulation proffered by the state.20 The Court reasoned that print advertisements 
posed less risk of overreaching or undue influence than in-person solicitation,21 and held 
that states are not permitted to restrict bUthful, non-deceptive attorney print advertising 
for any reason.22 
Though Zauderer presented a factual situation falling just short of direct-mail 
solicitation, the Supreme Court addressed the classic direct-mail scenario in Shapero 
v. Kentucky Bar Association.23 This case presented the question of whether a state 
could prohibit an attorney from engaging in bUthful and nondeceptive targeted direct-
mail solicitation of potential clients known to face particular legal problems.24 
The Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the American Bar Association's Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3,25 which prohibited targeted direct-mail solicitation 
by lawyers for pecuniary gain, to support its decision disallowing the proposed 
19 Id. at 630-3l. 
20 Id. at 639-42. The state advanced the traditional arguments, advanced in 
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465-68, that an absolute ban was necessary to prevent 
overreaching, undue influence, invasion of privacy, and fraud. Zauderer, 471 U.S. 
at 64l. 
21 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642. 
22 Id. at 646-47. 
23 486 U.S. 466 (1988). 
24 Id. at 468. Mr. Shapero, a member of the Kentucky Bar, requested a ruling 
from the State's Attorneys Advertising Commission on a proposed letter offering his 
legal services "to potential clients who have had a foreclosure suit filed against 
them." Id. at 469. 
25 Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983) [hereinafter cited as Model 
Rules]. The rules applicable to advertising and solicitation are Rule 7.1 through 7.5. 
The American Bar Association has amended Model Rule 7.3 in light of the Shapero 
decision; see infra, note 34. 
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solicitation.26 The United States Supreme Court reversed.27 
The Court equated the permissible targeted newspaper advertisement in Zauderer 
to a targeted mass-mailing of the type found in Shapero.2l! The Court also distinguished 
Shapero's targeted mass-mailing solicitation from the prohibited in-person solicitation 
found in Ohralik, finding targeted direct-mail posed less risk of abusive practices than 
did in-person solicitation.29 The Court held that states could not categorically prohibit 
targeted direct-mail solicitation which is neither false nor misleading, but that certain 
forms of regulation were indeed permissible.30 The Court also reiterated the principle 
that a total ban of in-person solicitation for pecuniary 
gain is permissible.31 
THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr 
The Shapero decision extended first amendment protection to all forms of non-
26 Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 108 Ky. 1916, 1920, rev'd 486 U.S. 
466 (1988). 
27 Shapero, 486 U.S. 466, 480 (1988). 
2l! [d. at 473-74. 
29 [d. at 475-76. "In assessing the potential for overreaching and undue 
influence, the mode of communication makes all the difference . . ." and in this 
respect "targeted, direct-mail solicitation is distinguishable from in-person solicitation 
" [d. at 475. 
30 [d. at 475-78. States may promulgate regulations that are "far ·less restrictive 
and more precise" than a total ban in order to minimize abuses and mistakes. [d. at 
476. Examples of permissible regulations include: the filing of direct-mail 
advertisements with an appropriate state agency; identification of the letter as an 
advertisement; inclusion of additional information or disclosures in every mailing; 
inclusion of information on how to report inaccurate or misleading letters. [d. at 
476-78. See also, Wechsler, Direct Mail Solicitation By Attorneys: A Pragmatic 
Approach To A New Rule, 39 SYR. L. REv. 973, 987-88 (1988). 
31 Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472, 475. The Court reviewed the factors justifying a 
prophylactic restriction of all in-person solicitation: in-person solicitation is a 
"practice rife with possibilities of overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of 
undue influence, and outright fraud" and "unique difficulties" adhere to state 
regUlation of in-person solicitation because it is "not visible or otherwise open to 
public scrutiny." [d. at 475 (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457-58, 466). 
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deceptive solicitation except in-person solicitation.32 The decision also directly 
invalidated the old ABA Model Rule 7.3.33 The ABA has amended Model Rule 7.3 
to comply with constitutional standards.34 The new ABA Model Rule prohibits lawyers 
from using direct-mail to contact potential clients who have made known their desire 
not to receive such communications and from engaging in conduct that involves 
coercion, duress or harassment. The rule also requires that targeted direct-mailings 
include the words "Advertising Material" on the envelope.35 The rule retains the 
complete prohibition on in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain of persons with whom 
the attorney has no family or prior professional relationship.36 
THE VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILITY 
The revised Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted in 1983. 
The Virginia Code deviates from the ABA Model Code in its standards for advertising, 
placing fewer restrictions on Virginia lawyers than the ABA recommended.37 The rules 
governing attorney advertising and solicitation are set forth in Canon 2 of the Virginia 
Code.38 
32 See Recent Developments, supra note 3, at 732-33. 
33 See supra note 25. 
34 See Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) ~ 81: 601-608 (Sept. 27, 
1989) (contains text of amended The Model Rule 7.3). 
35 Id.; Model Rule 7.3(b)(c) (as amended Feb, 7, 1989). 
36 Id.; Model Rule 7.3(a) (as amended Feb. 7, 1989). 
37 See Comment, The Status of Lawyer Advertising in Virginia: What Is Good 
Taste, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 629, 634 (1985). 
38 Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 2, DRs 2-101 through 2-
104 (1983) [hereinafter cited as VCPR]. Further guidelines to assist attorneys to 
determine when an advertisement or personal communication goes beyond the scope 
permitted by Virginia law are given in the Ethical Considerations which follow the 
Disciplinary Rules, ECs 2-1 through 2-17. 
DR 2-103, which concerns solicitation, reads, in part: 
(A) A lawyer shall not, by in-person communication, solicit 
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Advertising 
The advertising rule prohibits a lawyer from using a form of "public 
communication" which "contains a false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive statement 
or claim. "39 The rule also requires that public communication for which a lawyer gives 
value must be so identified unless it is apparent from the context of the 
communication.4O Public communication is defined as "all communication other than 
'in-person' communication."4\ 
Solicitation 
The solicitation rule prohibits only "in-person" communication - defined as "face 
to face communication and telephonic communication"42 - which is false or deceptive, 
or involves the use of, or the potential for, "coercion, duress, compulsion, intimidation, 
threats, unwarranted promises of benefits, overpersuasion, overreaching or vexatious or 
harassing conduct."43 Factors to be considered include "the sophistication regarding legal 
[d. 
employment as a private practitioner for himself, his partner, or 
associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm from a 
nonlawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a 
lawyer if: 
(1) Such communication contains a false, fraudulent, misleading, or 
deceptive statement or claim; or 
(2) Such communication has a substantial potential for or involves the 
use of coercion, duress, compUlsion, intimidation, threats, unwarranted 
promises of benefits, overpersuasion, overreaching, or vexatious or 
harassing conduct, taking into account the sophistication regarding legal 
matters, the physical, emotional or mentai state of the person to whom 
the communication is directed and the circumstances in which the 
communication is made. In person communication means face-to-face 
communication and telephonic communication. 
39 [d. at Canon 2, DR 2-101. 
40 [d. 
4\ [d. 
42 [d. at Canon 2, DR 2-103. 
43 [d. 
104 
matters, the physical, emotional, or mental state of the person to whom the 
communication is directed and the circumstances in which the communication is 
made."" 
The Virginia regime for regulating attorney advertising and solicitation provides 
a wide range of freedom for attorneys, particularly in the areas of direct-mail and in-
person solicitation. 
All forms of direct-mail solicitation, including targeted direct-mail, are considered 
"public communication" subject only to the prohibition against false or deceptive 
statements.45 Virginia has declined to adopt the alternative regulations suggested by the 
Court in Shapero and by the ABA in its amended Model Rule 7.3.46 
In-person solicitation of a nonlawyer who has not requested advice regarding 
employment is permissible if the solicitation is not false or misleading, or if it does 
not have the potential for coercion or duress, taking into account the recipient's mental, 
physical and emotional condition.47 Virginia has declined to adopt the stricter standard 
proposed by the ABA in its amended Model Rule 7.3, prohibiting in-person solicitation 
for pecuniary gain.48 
Enforcement and New Initiatives in Virginia 
The Virginia rule concerning solicitation, DR 2-103, is considerably more 
permissive than the solicitation rules in most other states. As noted above, this rule 
permits in-person solicitation which is not accompanied by threats, intimidation, 
overreaching or other forms of vexatious conduct. 
" Id. 
45 Id. at Canon 2, DR 2-101. 
46 See supra notes 29 and 34. 
47 VCPR at DR 2-103. 
48 See supra note 35. 
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Last year, the Virginia State Bar Association received numerous complaints 
from attorneys in the personal injury field concerning in-person solicitation of 
prospective clients by other attorneys. In June of 1989, the President of the Virginia 
State Bar Association, Philip B. Morris, appointed a special committee to investigate in-
person solicitation by personal injury lawyers in Virginia. The committee was charged 
with drafting a proposed modification to DR 2-103. On March 30, 1990, The Colonial 
Lawyer interviewed Mr. Morris about advertising and solicitation in Virginia and the 
status of the special committee's efforts to modify DR 2-103. 
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INTENTIONAL BLANK 
INTENTIONAL BLANK 
On March 30, 1990, Peter Jordan and Steve Nachman, Research Editors for The 
Colonial Lawyer, conducted an interview with State Bar President Philip B. Morris on 
attorney advertising and solicitation in Virginia: 
CL: As we were looking through the Virginia Disciplinary Rules (DRs) and the ABA 
Model Rules, we noticed that the Virginia rules provide more freedom for attorneys in 
the areas of advertising and solicitation, and in particular in the targeted direct-mail and 
in-person solicitation fields. How has this affected advertising and solicitation in 
Virginia? 
PM: Well, I can give you my thoughts on the application of the in-person solicitation 
rule in Virginia The rule in Virginia, which is DR 2-103, is clearly more 
permissive than the anti-solicitation rules in most other states. Under our rule 
solicitation itself is not a violation. In most cases, [the solicitation] must include 
vexatious or harassing conduct [in order to violate the rule]. 
CL: We understand that a commission has been formed to look into DR 2-103 and 
look into possible modifications [to the rule] in the. area of in-person solicitation [in 
personal injury cases]. Could you give us some background on the committee? 
PM: It came to my attention that there was an increase in the many areas of the state 
of lawyers soliciting personal injury cases in hospital rooms and private homes. I found 
that lawyers who do that argue that it is permitted under DR 2-103 unless the 
solicitation is accompanied by threats, intimidation, overreaching or other forms of 
vexatious conduct. What really brought it home to me was [one instance] where I was 
advised that a personal injury lawyer lecturing at a state approved CLE [continuing legal 
education] program on marketing told the audience that direct solicitation in personal 
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injury cases was pennitted in Virginia under DR 2-103. He told the audience it was 
an effective business development tool. My view of that is that it is ambulance 
chasing. It never has, never will and never should be accepted practice of any kind in 
Virginia. In any event, my concern was that not only was the practice clearly being 
engaged in, but that lawyers were, based on the ... looseness of our rule, encouraging 
other lawyers to do that. 
CL: How was this problem otherwise brought to your attention? 
PM: A number of lawyers who practice primarily in the plaintiffs field and lawyers 
that I have great respect for ... came to me and gave me some examples that they 
knew of in their practices or actual cases that they were aware of where this had 
occurred. They were very concerned about it because they felt it was not appropriate 
for Virginia . . " They felt that it was doing damage to the profession and they also 
felt that lawyers not engaging in those practices were at a competitive disadvantage. 
I received a number of examples, one being a contact in a funeral home which was 
characterized as being very similar to the scene in the movie [The Verdict]. I suspect 
that the person would have been reported and disciplined even under the Virginia rules. 
There are a whole lot of examples that fall short of that that allow lawyers, much as 
door-to-door salesmen knock on doors, to sit down in a living room with people 
involved in accidents . . . and solicit business without doing it in an overreaching or 
vexatious manner, and who ... refrain from the kinds of activities that are described 
under our rule that would be proscribed. It is clear in Virginia, even though I'm 
counting that the drafters never intended to do so, that direct contact with strangers to 
solicit personal injury cases in perSon is permitted under our rule as long as it is not 
accompanied by those forms of intimidation or vexatiousness that are described in the 
rule. 
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CL: Do you take the position that in those situations where a lawyer shows up at a 
funeral parlor or scene of an accident there is an implied coercion? 
PM: I suppose there would be circumstances that would be, in and of themselves, 
coercive, and I think showing up at the funeral parlor would fall into that category. 
You can infer from those circumstances that this was in violation of the rule, but that's 
not where the problem is. Those people will be turned in, found out, and they probably 
will be convicted. Same thing with an accident scene, and the same thing with 
somebody laying up in a body cast on medication within days of an accident. But 
where the practice is being promoted by other lawyers is later on when you go by and 
see people in the home or go by the hospital when someone is not drugged up and 
present them with your portfolio and convince them that you are the proper person to 
represent them in a personal injury case. That practice is not permitted in many states 
- Ohio, for example. I know that you must be familiar with the Ohralik case. This 
is not permitted in Ohio. It is not permitted in most other states, and it is permitted 
in Virginia. I have appointed a committee of lawyers to study the issue and requested 
that they come up with a legal, constitutionally sound rule change that will curtail this 
particular practice in Virginia. 
CL: When was the committee started and what are they currently working on? 
PM: I took office in June [1989] and appointed the commission shortly thereafter. The 
chairman is [So D.] Roberts Moore [of Roanoke], who has a broad-based trial practice, 
and there are eight or nine more people. It was my intent to balance [the commission] 
with plaintiffs' lawyers, people who normally represent defendants, and other people 
who are not in the personal injury field at all but have kept up with the constitutional 
issues [and other developments in this field] . . .. It is an extremely good committee. 
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They are having difficulty reaching a consensus because they are coming from different 
perspectives, and that's good. The [Virginia State Bar] Council itself is going to be 
acting on this issue at the June meeting. Whether the committee comes up with a 
consensus or not, the question will be put to the Bar Council to make a judgment as 
to whether or not [to approve a rule change] - assuming we can come up with a legally 
and constitutionally permissible rule change based on Ohralik. 
CL: Will the special committee be meeting in June? 
PM: No, that will be a meeting of the [State Bar] Council. . .. [Any rule changes] 
which we submit to the Supreme Court for action would have to come from the 
Council. An issue like this, once it is properly developed through study, and a proposal 
is made, will be presented to Council. It will be debated in Council, and Council will 
either vote it up or down. If we come up with a rule change which the Council votes 
up, then it will go to the Virginia Supreme Court and [the Court] could either approve 
the rule change or disapprove it. 
CL: Will the new rule focus only on personal injury cases? 
PM: I hope we will get alternate proposals that will allow people to pick the solution 
that they like best. The one that I like best and the one that I think . . . would pass 
the legal test necessarily would be one that is applicable to personal injury litigation. 
I make that statement based on the various statements of Mr. Justice Powell in the 
majority opinion in the Ohralik case. He gave us a great deal of guidance as to what 
would be permissible. I think it can be done. I don't think it is necessary in the 
commercial setting to do away with all solicitation. If the proposal to do away with 
in-person solicitation in personal injury cases fails, then I believe ... that the damage 
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[such solicitation] is doing professionally is sufficiently important that I would support 
an across-the-board ban on in-person solicitation. . .. In my judgment, that would not 
be the best way to go. But if we have a choice between allowing wholesale solicitation 
in personal injury cases, or abolishing in-person solicitation across the board - which 
used to be the rule - then I think the damage being done is so great that it would 
justify an across-the-board ban. 
CL: Do the problems with in-person solicitation go beyond the personal injury area? 
PM: I'm not aware of problems in other areas. I know that it is certainly common 
practice for lawyers to contact business executives in formal and informal settings 
. . .. Most county and city attorneys have [been approached] by members of the bar 
to work with them. Solicitation of that type where sophisticated people are hustling 
sophisticated people - it seems to me that that's different from the situation we are 
talking about here. 
CL: Have there been problems with lawyers contacting prospective clients by direct 
mail, for example in DUI, divorce or foreclosure proceedings where the attorneys get 
a hold of a list of people who are in trouble and send them a letter? 
PM: I think there is a potential for overreaching and a potential for harm [to the 
public] in that area. I think the same applies to some forms of advertising. . .. But, 
as Justice Powell said, the potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a 
lawyer solicits [in-person a prospective personal injury client]. That to me is 
hands-down unreasonable for the State to permit. 
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